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INTRODUCTION

The ideals of liberty and equality have animated revolutions,
both armed and otherwise. Constitutional revolutions are not
immune from such forces; indeed the twentieth century's most
adventurous constitutional interpretation has revolved around
those sibling stars. The first section of the fourteenth amendment
may be seen as a shorthand endorsement of the two ideals - the
due process clause has been a textual referent for the imposition
of libertarian values, and the equal protection clause has served
as the textual commitment to an evolving vision of constitutional
egalitarianism. 1
This fourteenth amendment companionship of liberty and
equality has, however, created opportunities for misunderstanding as well as for creative linkage. In particular, the judicial selection of values 'for special protection against the majoritarian pro1. The "privileges or immunities" clause of section one of the fourteenth amendment
barely survived the infanticide attempt upon it in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873). Its growth has remained stunted ever since. See Benoit, The Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be Life After Death? 11
SUFFOLK L. REv. 6 (1976); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last?" 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405; see also L. TRmE,.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 415-26 (1978). Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) accepts the construction of
the Slaughter-House Cases and represents the modern view. In contrast to the enormous
volume of modern equal protection and due process litigation, "privileges or immunities"
claims have become exceedingly rare. But cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (state
constitutional provision requiring that low-rent housing projects proposed by state authority be approved by majority of those voting in community election held not violative of
privileges and immunities clause); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
152 (1969) (use of streets to communicate thoughts between citizens one of the privileges.
and immunities of citizens of United States).
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cesses has wavered throughout the century between a liberty base
arid an equality base. In the end, the partnership of liberty and
equality in the fourteenth amendment - and their parallel
though textually incomplete partnership in the fifth amendment
- has led the Court into a tangle. Because the Court has uncritically substituted one for the other, and because historical circumstance and the value commitments of different generations have
combined in twisted patterns, liberty and equality have become
blurred as constitutional ideals.
The tangling is most apparent and most serious when viewed
in its relationship to the so-called "fundamental rights" developments in both equal protection and due process clause interpretation. In the sense used here, fundamental rights include all the
claims of individual rights, drawn from sources outside of the first
eight amendments, that the Supreme Court has elevated to preferred status (that is, rights which the government niay infringe
only when it demonstrates extraordinary justification). Included
in this category are rights of interstate travel, 2 exercising the franchise, 3 access to certain judicial forums, 4 and procreative choice. 5
The controversy over this body of doctrine has taken a variety ·of
forms, but well-educated students of constitutional law can deliver a somniloquy containing the most frequently recurring questions: What are the sources of these rights? Are the sources adequate to overcome the presumption against insulating substantive matters from the exercise of political power? Do the rights
have "principled" content? Are the rights wholly "judge-made"?
If so, what legitimate authority sanctions their creation? How are
judges, once cut loose from the framework of the Constitution, to
know which claims of right to recognize and which to ignore? The
list could be expanded, but the questions, no matter how they are
recast, seem tantalizingly to elude final answers.
2. The travel right antedates the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, see Crandall
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), but has been carried forward behind an equal
protection banner, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating one-year durational residence requirement for welfare benefits). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1974) (upholding Iowa's one-year residence requirement for divorce).
3. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding scheme limiting vote to landowners, in proportion to the assessed value of their land, in water storage district election).
See generally Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1111 (1975).
4. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fee for divorce petition
invalid); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed and state-paid
counsel in criminal appeals of statutory right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Despite this abundant supply of grist for the mill of judge or
scholar, the developments of the past twenty-five years highlight
a further question: Which new rights properly derive from the
liberty strand, and which from the equality strand? 0 Sometimes
the Court tells us; other times it does not. Often, members of the
Court agree upon the preferred status of an interest but disagree
about its textual source. 7 On occasion, members of the Court
concede that an interest has no textual source, yet battle still over
which strand of the fourteenth amendment protects it from state
interference. 8
Although doctrinal disagreement persists, one may still detect some general trends in the recent Supreme Court combat
over fundamental rights questions. The Burger Court has not
attempted to suppress, on either institutional or substantive principle, inclinations toward fourteenth amendment intervention. It
has, however, significantly rechanneled the activism of its predecessors, particularly that of the Warren Court. 9 It has resurrected
substantive due process intervention (whose death certificate had
supposedly been signed in 196310) on behalf of values to which the
Constitution does not explicitly refer. 11 Simultaneously, the
6. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113 (1973) (due process), with Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (analogous interests protected by the equal protection clause), and
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (analogous interests protected by the due process
clause) (alternative ground).
7. The reference is to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Bill of
Rights' penumbras, the ninth amendment, and "pure" substantive due process compete
for attention.
8. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the majority held that the equal
protection clause protected the right to travel, while Justice Harlan in dissent believed
that the due process clause was the relevant shield, 394 U.S. at 659. A similar doctrinal
dispute split the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), where the majority
held that the equal protection clause protected the right to marry. Justice Powell, in a
concurring opinion, felt the right found its source in the due process clause. 434 U.S. at
397.
9. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Funda•
mental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 5-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely, Foreword]. See
generally A. BICKEL, THE WARREN COURT AND THE IDEA or PROGRESS (1970); A. Cox, THE
WARREN COURT (1968). See also Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judi•
cial Review, 37 Mo. L. REv. 451, 451-54 (1978).
10. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
11. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This theme will be elaborated in detail throughout the re•
mainder of this Article. I am not the only one to notice the miracle. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIAUI ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 616-656 (9th ed. 1975); Dixon, The "New"
Substantive Due Process and Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV,
43; Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417 (1976); Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive
Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Perry, Ethical Function];
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 SUP. CT. REv. 261.
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Court has considerably curtailed its willingness to rely on the
equal protection clause for the advancement of values newly recognized as constitutionally important.
This Article explores such trends in the context of several
recent cases and in the broader context of established patterns of
constitutional law. Section II shows how the different strains of
fourteenth amendment activism over the past century have tangled the strands of the fourteenth amendment in a thick, almost
impenetrable knot. Section ill studies the tangle's reflection in
three cases raising fundamental rights problems - Maher v.
Roe, 12 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 13 and Zablocki v. Redhail.14 Finally, Section N offers what Sections II and III suggest is missing from fourteenth amendment case faw- a theory,
abstract but functional, of the separate strands. It suggests that
the only proper sources for judicial discovery of fundamental libertarian values outside the constitutional text and structure are
those which demonstrate that the values are "deeply embedd~d"
within American society. Further, Section N contends that the
equality strand cannot and should not bear a substantive content
- that equal protection, whether viewed in moral terms or process terms, should remain substantially rooted in the pure antidiscrimination concerns that sparked the textual embrace with
equality.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment has, at different times, recognized both its libertarian and egalitarian dimensions. Unfortunately, the Court has
failed to maintain a clear distinction between them. This doctrinal imprecision has bred unpredictability, disrespect, and
charges of outcome-orientation. The first of these phenomena is
perhaps an inescapable fact of judicial life. The latter two may
be minimized by judicial articulation of a clear and principled
theory of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. The equal protection clause and the due process clause are complementary not interchangeable - safeguards against oppressive government; they can carry out their missions most effectively when
their separate roles are respected. Whether the fourteenth
amendment remains a credible source of protection for the individual depends upon the process of untangling.
12. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
13. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
14. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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STRANDS THAT PASSED IN THE NIGHT - AN OVERVIEW OF THE
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1879-1977)

A.

1879-1937 -

The Dominance of Due Process ("Liberty")
Activism

One need not possess an acute sense of constitutional history
to realize that at the same time the Supreme Court was relying
on the due process clause to actively oppose governmental regulation of economic activity, 15 it characterized the equal protection
clause as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." 18
From its genesis in the Slaughter-House Cases dissents 17 through
its flowering in Lochner v. New York, 18 substantive due process
doctrine first threatened and then worked a reign of terror on
attempted regulation of wages, hours of labor, and unionization. 19
Rooted in laissez faire ideology, both social and economic, the
doctrine confined both the objectives and the resources of the
police power. 20 Although economic libertarian ideology found expression in other constitutional settings, 21 the due process clauses
of the fifth 22 and fourteen1,11 amendments carried the brunt of the
load. This judicial infusion of values of economic freedom into the
due process clauses dominated the constitutional law of the first
third of the twentieth century. 23
15. See generally L. TiuBE, supra note 1, at 427-55.
16. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1926).
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), at 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting), 114-16 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 737-39 (1975).
20. Lochner explicitly confined police power objectives by holding that equalization
of bargaining power between employees and employers is not a legitimate goal of government, and police power resources by holding that a maximum hour law was insufficiently
necessary to preserve the health of bakers to justify the law's infringement on liberty of
contract.
21. The scope of national power in the federal system was the most prominent. See,
e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating taxing and spending scheme
designed to control agricultural production); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922)
(invalidating tax on employers who used child labor because its prohibitory effect and
purpose were not within Congress's taxing power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (invalidating prohibition on interstate shipment of goods produced with the aid of
child labor); cf. United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878) (Congress exceeded its bankruptcy power). The contract clause served as a vehicle for similar expression. See, e.g.,
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923).
22. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal law against "yellow
dog" contracts on interstate railroads held to violate due process clause of fifth amendment).
23. Objections to that line of doctrines are, of course, quite massive: (1) The Court
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It is instructive to note that the activism of the Lochner era
might have been channeled through the equal protection clause.
Given the infancy of protective labor legislation, most if not all
such statutes covered limited classes of workers' hazards, and
hence were underinclusive in their coverage of employment risks~
Despite the apparent judicial distaste for legislative activity in
this field, the Court might have invalidated labor legislation for
failure to extend coverage to all similarly situated workers. 24 The
ostensible reasons for not adopting such an approach illuminate
the Cou'rt's contemporary struggle with these companion provisions.
First, and perhaps foremost, a premise of legal analysis during the Lochner period was the inviolability of the naturally unequal distribution of ability and fortune among persons. 25 Given
lacked justification for protecting liberty of contract by way of the due process clause,
because the liberty protected by the clause is limited to freedom from physical restraint,
see, e.g., Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the .
Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARv. L.
REv. 365 (1890); (2) The Court lacked textual warrant for the entire notion of "substantive
due process" because the concern of the due process clause is limited to "process" (i.e.,
procedural regularity); (3) The nature of the Court's methodology required it to exercise
judgments of a legislative (nonjudicial) character, thereby involving it in decisions belonging exclusively to another branch of government, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); (4) The Court's resort to "natural law" as the source
of substantive constitutional rights was vague, open-ended and inescapably subjective,
and it imperiled the notion that, absent a clear mistake, the democratic process is the sole
repository of power to sort out the important choices of policy and value, see Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129,
144 (1893). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Ely, Foreword, supra note 9; Dixon, supra note 11.
Interestingly enough, although each of those objections has been influential in the
evolution of post-Lochner doctrine, none has systematically prevailed on the Court. Indeed, the only prevailing objection to Lochnerism is extraordinarily narrow; it is, simply,
that liberty of contract is of insufficient constitutional significance to support the relatively stringent review standard imposed in Lochner. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at
15. The plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), traces
its lineage to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). Justice
Harlan argued that substantive due process protects against arbitrary impositions upon
liberty, citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Because the result of Allgeyer
has clearly been discredited, Justice Harlan's citation can only be read as approving of
the flexibility and expansive coverage of substantive due process enshrined in the Lochner
era, while disapproving of the intensity of protection given economic values at that time.
24. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold [the New
York hours regulation for bakers] as a first installment of a general regulation of
the hours of work. Whether in [that] aspect it would be open to the charge of
inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss.
(emphasis added.)
25. See R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINIS~ IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 143-56 (1944).

988

Michigan Law Review

LVol. 77:981

that premise, it would have been absurd for the Court to denounce statutes designed to remedy that inequality with a theory
that the states had not gone far enough in doing so. Such a posture would have risked provoking legislation that even-handedly
and systematically protected all wage laborers. Second, the equal
protection clause had been limited by the Slaughter-House Cases
to a particular concern with racial discrimination. 28 At the turn
of the century, the Court did not have so much as a dissenting
opinion for authority to invigorate the equal protection clause
with economic libertarianism. Finally (and most instructively for
students of recent developments), the Court's approach to economic regulation retained a flexibility, a capability for ad hoc
assessment of competing interests, that an equality-centered doctrine could not accommodate. 'Z1
Contemporaneously with the flowering of economic due process, the Court infused that clause with a noneconomic substantive content that has survived subsequent pruning. 28 Modern first
amendment doctrine takes as given what Gitlow u. New York 29
first announced - free expression is a substantive liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment against state intrusion. 30
More fundamentally for this Article's purposes, parental prerogatives in childrearing found constitutional solicitude in Meyer u.
Nebraska 31 and Pierce u. Society of Sisters. 32 Those cases can be,
and at times have been, rerationalized as attempts to protect
values derived from the first amendment, 33 rendering them of a
piece with Gitlow as early signals of full-blown incorporation of
first amendment liberties into the fourteenth. The most recent
reliances on Meyer and Pierce, however, have stressed their nontextual underpinnings of protected interests in family auton26. "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held
to come within the purview of the provision [equal protection clause]," Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
27. If underinclusion had been the asserted vice, drawing lines between bakers and
mine workers as the Court did would have been nonsense.
28. The pruning began in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Its
effects are discussed more fully below, see text at notes 36-52 infra.
29. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
30. There is apparently little modem controversy regarding the coextensiveness of'
free expression guarantees against state and federal agencies of government. But see Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting),
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
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omy. 34 The survival of those two cases in that form suggests that
the only durable objection to the Lochner era's handiwork is that
it generally selected the "wrong" values for protection. 35 Whether
the chaff that stripped bakers of the protection of hours regulation can be alchemically transformed into the wheat that protects
parental choice of schools or curricula was a question that would
agitate the second half of the twentieth century more than·the
first.

B. 1937-1953 - The Era of Qualified Passivity
The "switch in time, " 38 marked in part by the Court's retreat
from boundless intervention in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 37
did more than"save the Nine." The Court, by 1937, had exhausted its interventionist capital, and had thoroughly discredited itself as a sensitive and responsible institution of government. Observers viewed the dramatic shift away from fourteenth
amendment activism as a restoration of the Court's appropriately
limited role in the process of government.38 Throughout this period, the equal protection clause remained largely dormant, except in occasional matters of race39 and the extraordinary case of
34. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
35. See note 23 supra.
36. See B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CoNBmtmONAL LAw 202 (1942).
37. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
38. The heavy criticism to which the Court was subjected is outlined in L; TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 8-6. Before the West Coast Hotel decision, the Court was faced not only
with the possibility of Roosevelt's Court packing plan, but also with emerging criticism
of the legitimacy of judicial review itself. See, e.g., Representative Maverick Says Supreme Court Must be Deprived of Power to Declare Laws Unconstitutional, New York
Times, Feb. 1, 1937, at 5, col. 6.
The New York Times editorial, A Historic Session, which appeared June 2, 1937, at
22, col. 1, exemplifies the public reaction to West Coast Hotel. The editorial applauded
several recent course-changing decisions, and emphasized that the Constitution must be
living law, responsive to change. It contended further that these apparently revolutionary
decisions were actually not sharp breaks with the past (pointing to decisions by Justices
Marshall and Field).
39. It was during this period that the seeds of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) were sown. See McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Court demonstrated a greater
receptivity to racial claims during this period than previously. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" train accommodation law), with
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73· (1932), and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (both
cases invalidating laws that either directly or indirectly denied blacks the right to vote iI
primary elections). It is interesting to speculate on whether the Cow:t's passivity in substantive due process matters was in any way related to the moderate racial activism that
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Skinner u. Oklahoma. 40 The substantive side of the due process
clause underwent elaborate extractive dental work. The newly
restrained due process required no more than j~dicial identification of a public good that might arguably be served by a challenged statute; 41 at times, the Court hinted that economic due
process was utterly fictional. 42
The only stirrings of judicial activism in the direction of
libertarian forms of protection consisted of two related movements: one towards a "preferred position" 43 for expressive interests, a development that built on earlier theories of linkage between the first and fourteenth amendments, 44 and another towards partial and selective absorption in the due process clause
of various Bill of Rights safeguards. Dicta in Palko u. Connecticut, 45 decided in the first year of the era, fused the two movements by concluding that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause imposed upon the states an irreducible minimum of
individual rights safeguards, of which expressive freedom constituted the clearest example. Despite the restraint with which the
Court employed Palko's "ordered liberty" theory, the case was a
dominant force during this period, and its reasoning undergirded
subsequent claims of judicial authority to imbue the due process
· clause with substantive values from both within and without the
Bill of Rights. 48
the Court displayed - whether the Court was consciously choosing to ride elevators in
opposite directions. Conscious or not, serious strand-tangling began here.
40. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the Court struck down on equal protection
grounds an Oklahoma statute prescribing sterilization for certain habitual criminal offenders.
41. "We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of
the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which 'should be left
where . . . it was left by the Constitution - to the States and to Congress.'" Olsen v,
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). See also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). Nevertheless, the Court never formally abandoned
the notion that legislative regulation must be in furtherance of the public interest. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 451 n.17.
42. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
43. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
44. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The
Carolene Products footnote has inspired more commentary than Chief Justice Stone's
wildest dreams could have anticipated. See generally Ely, 37 MD. L. REv., supra note 9,
at 454-469, and sources cited at nn.18-19 (1978).
45. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
46. Indeed, it cannot be accidental that Palko appeared shortly after West Coast
Hotel and shortly before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Palko implied a
reservation of judicial right to establish a "transcendental body" of constitutional law, 304
U.S. at 79. Viewed as a piece with West Coast Hotel's deference to legislative judgments
concerning economic freedom and Erie's rejection of the concept of transcendent common
law, Palko seems strangely out of the period's positivist character. At the height, then, of
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This period also laid the groundwork for subsequent expansions of the fourteenth amendment in other ways -in particular,
Justice Black's eloquent rumblings about full-blown Bill of
Rights incorporation, 47 Chief Justice Stone's immortal fourth
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 48 and Justice
Jackson's perceptive hint about the relatively "restrained" quality of equal protection intervention.49 By the yardstick of concrete
results, however, the era begun by announced withdrawal from
Lochner ideology and concluded by the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice stands as the low ebb of fourteenth amendment activism in the twentieth century. The passivity of this
period has often been explained as a reaction, perhaps an overreaction, to the vices of Lochnerism. 50 When viewed, however,
against the backdrop of the Court's narrow construction of the
fourteenth amendment soon after its ratification, 51 the period
from 1937-1953 stands as a momentary and fragile judicial recollection that aggressively employed fourteenth amendment theories of "ordered liberty," "natural law," or fundamental rights
render the Court a ''perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States. " 52
C. 1954-1969 -'-- The Warren Court and the Emergence
of Equal Protection Activism
The elaborate equal protection developments of the Warren
Court need no lengthy recitation here. I will simply track the
major features of those developments, their unifying and motivating themes, and their relationship to the continuing saga of substantive due process. The Warren Court took on the "dual society" in Brown v. Board of Education, 53 and· worked at dismantling it until Shapiro v. Thompson54 ended the era in style. The
Court stood Lochnerism on its head; rather than viewing inequality as the divinely ordained and uninterruptable order of things,
federal judicial withdrawal from scrutiny of state laws and rules of decision, Palko is
striking evidence of the persistence of expansive theories of the fourteenth amendment.
47. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See note 44 supra.
49. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
50. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 450-55.
51. The fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868.
52. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residence requirement for AFDC welfare benefits
violates equal protection clause).
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it saw inequalities deriving from racial and economic disadvantage as the major obstacles to domestic tranquility and a more
perfect union. 55 It therefore attacked full force qn the equal protection front. 56 Simultaneously, a majority of the Court remained
steadfast and vigorous in its refusal to give an active, nontextual
substantive content to the due process clause. 57
The Court's equality commitment, however, never quite escaped the charge that it was Lochnerism reincarnated. 58 Virtually
none of the Court's truly controversial equal protection decisions
relied solely on the nature of the classification; rather, all seemed
inextricably linked with the substantive interests at stake. 69
Brown laid heavy emphasis on the value of education. 00 More
critically, the Court's concern with the deprivations attributable
to economic disadvantage was bound up with values lacking explicit constitutional protection. The linkage was evident in a series of decisions in which the Warren Court held that the equal
protection clause barred the ·states from denying indigent criminal defendants appellate transcripts61 and appellate counsel, 62
from denying the vote in state elections to those unable or unwill55. See generally Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV, 91 (1966).
56. See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963):
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like
cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they
believe the legislature has acted unwisely- has long since been discarded. We have
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgments of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws.
58. Even a devoted fan of the Court's commitment saw clearly the parallels between
the Lochner period and the 1960s. See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas
and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process" Formula, 16 UCLA L. REv. 716, 739,
744, 745-46 (1969).
59. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) {right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeal).
60. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954): "We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs
of the equal protection of the laws."
Desegregation decisions subsequent to Brown appeared less concerned with the underlying substantive interest. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curinm)
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf course); Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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ing to pay a poll tax, 63 and from "penalizing" recent migrants to
the state by conditioning welfare benefits upon durational residency requirements. 64 In the criminal appeal cases, the Court
acknowledged the due process clause component of its theory, 65
but the cases' obviously procedural setting preempted serious
criticism of that component. 66 On the other hand, the Court did
not provide such explicit recognition of its debt to the due process
clause (or, for that matter, any other constitutional provision) in
those cases in which nontextual substantive values emerged as
fundamental. Rhetorically free of any substantive due process
content, cases protecting interests in ballot-casting and interstate migration became key elements of the so-called fundamental interests wing of equal protection doctrine. 67
Particularly illustrative of the Warren Court methodology
was Shapiro v. Thompson, 68 in which the Court held that durational residency requirements for welfare benefits impermissibly
burdened the right of interstate migration. Shapiro suggested the
right had several possible textual sources - the privileges and
immunities clauses of article N and the fourteenth amendment,
or the commerce clause. 69 Whatever the source of the right, the
Court relied on the equal protection clause (which clearly was not
its source) to invalidate the challenged durational residency requirements. That reliance echoed the integrating theme of a great
bulk of the Warren Court's work; 70 as suggested above, Brown and
63. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
64. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. "Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire
judicial system - all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' ,,· Griffin v. -Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
66. See generally Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 289, 295. Cf. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 7,
25-27 (1969) (due process implications of criminal procedure "equality" decisions). The
procedural due process aspect of Griffin was virtually ignored in Willcox & Bloustein, The
Griffin Case - Poverty and The Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
67. E.g., the due process clause is not mentioned by the majority in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). In his Harper dissent, however, Justice Black charged that Harper was part of a
trend which employed "the old 'natural-law-due-process' formula to justify striking down
state laws as violations of the Equal Protection Clause.'' 383 U.S. at 675-77. See generally
Karst, supra note 58.
68. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
69. 394 U.S. at 630 n.8.
70. See generally A. Cox, supra note 9, at 49-50.
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Shapiro are end points of a straight line measuring egalitarian
progress.
Griswold v. Connecticut11 provided the severest test for a
Court determined to advance chosen values- apparently, political access and physical mobility were prominent among them without renewing the romance with the dreaded demon of substantive due process. Justice Douglas's famous "penumbras" and
"emanations" opinion drew upon the incorporation legacy, rather
than a doctrine of "naked" substantive due process, and tortured
the Bill of Rights into yielding a protected zone of privacy that
would not tolerate a law banning contraceptive use by married
couples. Justice Goldberg's reliance upon the ninth amendment
in his concurring opinion was equally disingenuous in its attempt
to avoid the jaws of substantive due process.72 Only Justices
White and Harlan73 were willing to grapple directly with the fearful creature, and concluded that a law invading marital choice
about contraception violated the due process clause itself, independent of links with the Bill of Rights. Shocking though that
analysis may have been at the time, subsequent developments
seem to have confirmed the White-Harlan view, and not the magical mystery tour of the zones of privacy, as the prevailing doctrine of Griswold. 74
Ultimately, the equal protection clause did for the Warren
Court precisely what the due process clause did for the Lochnerera Court - it served as a vehicle for judicial intervention in state
policy choices to promote a set of values responsive to the Justices' vision of political and social ideals. Wars on poverty and
racism were at the forefront of the liberal vision of those fifteen
years. 75 The Court perhaps never knew whether it was the commanding general or merely a footsoldier in the fray. Nonetheless,
it was certain that the battle was raging and that failure to defend
the forces of light was symbolically to embrace the forces of darkness. Throughout the struggle, however, the Court never lost sight
of which strand of the fourteenth amendment was tied to the
battle mast. Constitutional history and the Court's value commitment combined to unleash a species of equal protection activ71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. 381 U.S. 479, 490 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
73. 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court obliquely
returned to those zones in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text at notes 84-92 infra.
75. See E. WARREN, MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 297 (1977); A. Cox, supra note 9, at
5-12.
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ism that seemed to suit, and sometimes even to lead, the progressive forces of the day.
All of this high spirit was not without its occasional interpretive hurdles. In particular, what was a Court advancing equal
protection concepts - while at the same time soberly reminding
us of the death of substantive due process - to do about _restraining the federal government? Fortuitously, Korematsu v. United
States16 had provided a legacy from which to draw an answer.
Although the fifth amendment contains a due process clause but
lacks an explicit equal protection analogue to section one of the
fourteenth amendment, Korematsu had engrafted an antidiscrimination principle onto the fifth amendment. Thus, in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 77 and with little serious question since, the
Court held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment has
an "equal protection" component that restricts the national government in a manner virtually identical to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection restrictions upon the states. 78
This development would seem to buttress an argument that
the equal protection clause is constitutionally superfluous: if the
due process clause of the fifth amendment can do equality's work,
the comparable fourteenth amendment strand, standing alone,
might theoretically have done the same. But that suggestion confuses horses with carts. When the Warren era opened, due process
76. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
77. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
78. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976) (unimportant

whether fifth or fourteenth amendment applies as statute in question clearly violates
either); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163 (1964). Only the last two of these cases, of course, were decided during the
Warren Court years. Nevertheless, the doctrine appeared to be "well-settled" by 1968.
One obvious exception to the symmetry of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' respective equality components is the exclusion of aliens from opportunities provided to citizens.
The cases establish broad federal power, but limit state power, to so treat aliens. Compare
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Congress's immigration power causes legitimacy classification in immigration laws to be subject to deferential scrutiny), and Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress's immigration power causes alienage classification in Medicare program to be subjected to deferential scrutiny), with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (state may not exclude aliens from law practice) and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973) (states may not exclude aliens from competitive civil service employment). That simple division of authority between nation and state is not always controlling. Compare Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Federal Civil Service
Commission constitutionally forbidden from excluding aliens from federal civil service),
with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state may exclude aliens from state police
force). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977).
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clause activism, outside of Bill of Rights concerns, was in the
deepest disrepute. The language and the relatively untroubled
history of the equal protection clause combined to render acceptable a species of judicial interventionism that, had it rested on
the due process clause, would have been intolerable. At the very
least, the Warren Court's dive into egalitarianism would have
been perceived as wholly lacking legitimacy if its platform had
been a provision whose use had almost destroyed earlier Courts.
The subsequent leap from equal protection activism to parallel
fifth amendment limits on the central government was a simple
step towards symmetry - what the Constitution insulates from
state regulation "surely" cannot be freely trampled by national
authority.79 The resulting parallelism of equality limits is thus the
product of reverse incorporation; just as the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment imposes Bill of Rights guarantees on
the states, so the analogous fifth amendment clause operates to
impose fourteenth amendment guarantees on the federal government. Whether viewed as a matter of theory or as an historical
phenomenon, however, the presence of the equal protection
strand gave new life to both the fifth and the fourteenth amendments.
The Court's masking of judicial value choices in equal protection rhetoric, and its use of that clause to increase dramatically the burden of justification demanded of states in certain
areas of regulation, did not escape critical notice, either on or off
the Court. In the Warren Court's final Term, its decision in
Shapiro provoked a dissent from Justice Harlan that echoed
across seventy years of intertwining fourteenth amendment
strands. He attacked what he referred to as "the compelling interest" doctrine (more commonly understood as the fundamental
interest wing) of the equal protection clause:
I think this [necessities of life] branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception which threatens to swallow
the standard equal protection rule. Virtually every state statute
affects important rights . . . . Rights [of economic freedom] ...
are in principle indistinguishable from those involved here, and to
extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in which such
rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a "super79. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954): "In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government."
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legislature." . . . When the right affected is one assured by the
Federal Constitution, any infringement can be dealt with under
the Due Process Clause. But when a statute affects only matters
not mentioned in the Federal Constitution and is not arbitrary or
irrational, . . _,,. I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick
out particular human activities, characterize them as
"fundamental," and give them added protection under an unusually stringent equal protection test. 80

Despite Justice Harlan's admonitions, egalitarianism remained the driving force of Warren Court activism. That force
had its own momentum, reinforced by parallel commitments
from other branches of government. 81 But egalitarianism as a
constitutional concept, particularly when it assumed the
"fundamental interest" form, was broad enough to engender
great expectations and simultaneously to self-destruct. Equality
as a goal admitted little compromise. As change came upon the
mood of the nation and the personnel of the Court, the judicial
choices became (a) continued vigorous pursuit of equality, (b)
outright rejection of the Warren Court heritage, or (c) a reshaping
of doctrine to fit a new temperament.

D. The Burger Decade -A Preliminary Look at
the Strands Recrossing
The Fourth Republic of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence is underway. Unlike the Second, in which the activism of
the First was fairly uniformly rejected, the Fourth Republic has
treated its predecessors more erratically. Yet one conclusion
80. 394 U.S. at 661-662 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Commentators
were similarly aware of the sleight-of-hand: "When an equal protection decision rests on
this basis [fundamental interests], it may be little more than a substantive due process
decision decked out in the trappings of equal protection." Developments in the Law, supra
note 56, at 1132. The fundamental interests doctrine met with both acclaim, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 66, and criticism, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and
the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REv. 41, 89 (arguing that the theory is openended, and the choice of which values are fundamental is not made on a principled basis).
81. Congressional adoption of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71
Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), and 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,
74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.), reflected a deep concern
with remedying racial discrimination in voting. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), was more comprehensive. It included, for example, provisions dealing with desegregation of schools and public
facilities. Title VII of the 1968 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976), expanded Congress's
egalitarian concern to include fair housing. President Johnson's declaration of a "War on
Poverty" illustrated a parallel executive commitment to egalitarian ideals. Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, Jan. 8, 1964, lLYNDONB. JOHNSON Pua. PAPERS
112, 113.
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emerges with startling clarity - fundamental rights activism
stemming from the equal protection clause has been laid to rest,
and in its stead has arisen an active doctrine o_f substantive due
process.
The watershed year was 1973, when the Court blasted with
both barrels. With only the barest obeisance to the Griswold privacy penumbras, it embraced a substantive due process theory in
Roe v. Wade, 82 holding that a woman's liberty to choose termination of her pregnancy was of a constitutionally preferred status.
Only a few months later, the Court rejected in San Antonio Independent School District u. Rodriguez 83 an equal protection attack
on the interdistrict disparities in per pupil expenditure resulting
from property tax financing of public education.
The Court's misguided search in Griswold for a general zone
of privacy in the penumbras of amendments I through VITI saved
the Roe Court a great deal of trouble. Spared the awkward obligation of embracing a doctrine of substantive due process completely divorced from textual or structural values, the majority in
Roe merely cited Griswold as authority for a textually rooted
privacy doctrine, 84 asserted that general interests in procreation
belong within the constitutional concept of privacy, 85 and concluded that the choice to terminate a pregnancy was a sufficiently
significant element of procreative freedom to require extraordinary justification from any state that seeks to restrict it. 88 To
what I am certain was no Justice's surprise, few seemed fooled by
Roe's flimsy attempt to maintain a textual cloak of legitimacy
around the decision. Griswold's ties to the Bill of Rights were
attenuated, but at least the "home as castle" theme linked its
factual setting to the third and fourth amendments. 87 Nothing
about the abortion decision can claim even that degree of kinship
to the Bill. 88
Since the Roe majority's suggestion that the abortion choice
lies safely within a penumbra of a penumbra is so unpersuasive,
the case is more accurately understood as an exercise in "naked"
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
84. 410 U.S. at 129, 152.
85. 410 U.S. at 152.
86. 410 U.S. at 153-56.
87. See Ely, 37 Mo. L. REv., supra note 9, at 452 n.7.
88. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 928-933 (1973).
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substantive due process. 89 The reliance on Griswold authority was
a fiction, but while it virtuously maintained the appearance of
continuity, that reliance led to a serious vice as well- an illusory
exemption from the duty to explain and defend the substantive
due process theory of the opinion. Moreover, the political volatility of the abortion issue has deflected scholars from emphasizing
that duty. Given Roe's emotional and moral context, commentators have paid most attention to the intrinsic merits of Roe's
calculus of interests, private and governmental. A few came to
bury Roe, 90 others to praise it, 91 but the question of a reinvigorated
future for substantive due process, as a matter of theory and
methodology, has received significantly less attention than the
Griswold decision produced in response to its privacy doctrine a
decade earlier. 92
89. Cf. id. at 933 (comparing Roe to Lochner, and asserting that Roe is a more glaring
example of indefensible judicial value infusion, lacking constitutional support). See also
Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP.
CT. REv. 159.
90. Epstein, supra note 89; Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a
Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1250 (1975).
91. See, e.g., Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297-311
(1973). Most of those in praise of Roe, it should be noted, lauded its result without
necessarily complimenting its system of reasoning.
92. Griswold produced voluminous scholarly commentary. Seen by commentators as
a sharp break with the recent past and as a hint of an exciting new direction in constitutional law, each of the several opinions in Griswold inspired massive scholarly speculation
on the future of the privacy doctrine, the ninth amendment, and substantive due process
revisited. See, e.g., Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965); Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965); Beaney, The Griswold Case
and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 979; Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814 (1966).
That Griswold sparked more theoretical speculation than Roe may have resulted from
differing scholarly perceptions of the Warren and Burger Courts. Commentators probably
believed that the former was aggressive enough to extend Griswold in a variety of fascinating directions. That judgment was for the most part erroneous. Between 1965 and 1969
the Court carefully avoided decision in cases that might have pushed outward, or clarified,,
the boundaries of Griswold. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (sodomy prosecution of married couple); Ferrell v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (public school hair length regulation). Conversely, Roe inspired somewhat less creativity, partly because the Griswold commentary had exhausted
most of it. More fundamentally, perhaps, those writing after Roe either condemned it, and
had no inclination to speculate on the future of substantive due process, or were so pleased
with it that they feared undermining its legitimacy by terming it a product of pure
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Several months after Roe, the opinion for a narrow majority
in Rodriguez signaled a retreat from fundamental rights activism,
equal-protection-style, every bit as pronounced as Roe's plunge
into due process intervention. In Rodriguez, the claimant's argument for constitutional reordering of public school financing
placed its weight against the flimsiest pillars of the Warren Court
edifice: the hints of presumptive invalidity of wealth-based classifications93 and the fundamentality of certain "constitutionally
significant" interests, a group to which "education" arguably belonged. The plaintiffs apparently hoped that at least one of these
theories, or perhaps their interaction, would trigger "strict scrutiny" - a demand for extraordinary justification of the challenged inequality. 94 After rejecting the "wealth" claim as inappropriate to the case's facts, the Court announced that the manufacture of fundamental interests, for equal protection purposes,
would no longer be a growth industry:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is
"fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or
housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as
important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. 95

Dicta in Rodriguez left ajar the door of judicial solicitude for
claims of absolute denial, rather than relative deprivation, of
public education. 96 Nevertheless, the holding that, in the absence
of proven use of suspect classifying criteria, claims of unequal
distribution of educational opportunities would be subject only to
rationality scrutiny suggested much more than a mere failure of
that particular claim. Indeed, the entire discussion of the
Rodriguez "fundamental rights" claim proceeded on the articusubstantive due process adjudication. But cf. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 91, at 777•
79. (Roe relies on basic value related to widely accepted concepts of society).
93. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1968); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966). By the time the Rodriguez suit made
its way to the Supreme Court, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), had firmly rejected
such a constitutional stance.
94. The equal protection theory underlying the Rodriguez claim is handsomely elaborated in J. CooNS,
CLUNE & s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
95. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
96. 411 U.S. at 37.

w.
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late~ assumption that the fundamentality of a right depends on
its coincidence with textual or structural values. 97
That Roe and Rodriguez were decided close in time was presumably a historical accident, but the accident dramatized a
collision between the strands of the fourteenth amendment as
they crossed paths once again. All would agree that neither abortion nor educational opportunity is explicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution; is the implication of a guarantee truly stronger for
the former than for the latter? And if the Court is· unauthorized
or incompetent to create substantive rights in the enforcement of
equal protection, how does it acquire authorization or competence for substantive due process adjudication?
Although doctrinal conflicts over fourteenth amendment interpretation persist, 98 the Burger Court's decisions over the past
five years reveal intermittent untangling of the strands. The
Court's substantive fourteenth amendment adjudication reflects
(1) an expansion of suspect classification doctrine, in hybrid
form, to protect women, 99 aliens, 100 and chiidren born out of wed97. See text at note 95 supra.
98. The dilemmas and pressures of Rodriguez, viewed from the level of "two-tiered"
equal protection, contributed further to the process of intertwining fourteenth amendment
strands. In his Rodriguez dissent, 411 U.S. at 98-111, Justice Marshall elaborated on his
dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970), and formulated a so-called
"sliding scale" of equal protection review. According to Justice Marshall, the intensity of
equal protection scrutiny has been and should continue to be a function of the nature of
the classification created by statute, the nature of the substantive interest affected
thereby, and the impact of the classification on that interest. In his view, interests need
not be fully "preferred" in order to garner judicial care; rather, the closer the interest,
logically or pragmatically, to a recognized fundamental one, the more judicial attention
should be paid to relative deprivations of it.
Apart from the conventionally understood drawbacks of that theory, see The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 105-16 (1973), Justice Marshall's view incorrectly
and indefensibly tangles the strands of the fourteenth amendment. As will be elaborated
in greater detail below, the equal protection strand properly speaks to the permissibility
of classification bases, and to no more; substantive due process, in contrast, speaks to
substantive liberties, without direct regard to the inequality of their distribution. See
Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications - A More Modest Role for
Equal Protection, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 108-21. Of course, inequality may enter the
analysis at the level of evaluating the state's justification for restricting the liberty. See,
e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200-01 (1973); but see Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S.
92 (1972). Although Justice Marshall's attempt to burst through the conceptual barriers
of two-tier equal protection has met with some success, see United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); see generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972), its tangling of fourteenth amendment
ideas fosters analytical confusion, unprincipled decision and "doctrinal disorder," Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978).
99. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636

Michigan Law Review

1002

LVol. 77:981

ef

lock101 against legislative discrimination; (2) a usually steadfast
refusal to recognize, for purposes of intensifying equal protection
review, substantive interests other than those recognized by the
Warren Court; 102 and (3) an invigoration of pure substantive due
process theories, partly by way of the irrebuttable presumptions
fiction 103 and partly with full candor, 104 to protect procreative
choices and family autonomy.
These innovations have taken the Burger Court in the proper
direction; its equality-based activism confronts what are truly
classification problems and its concern with substantive rights is
less often expressed through inappropriate equal protection
methodology and rhetoric. But questions remain: What is the
appropriate direction for the new substantive due process? Is it
any more legitimate, principled, or confinable than the old? And
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
100. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
101. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Judicial solicitude for illegitimate
children predated the Burger Court. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
102. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boreas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (no fundamental
interest in nonfamilial association for residential purposes); San Antonio Indep, School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a "fundamental interest"); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no "fundamental interest" in housing); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no "fundamental interest" in welfare benefits). But cf,
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (intermediate scrutiny
oflimitation on right to receive food stamps by unrelated member of household); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) ("fundamental right" to marry triggers strict equal protection review). Zablocki is analyzed in detail in Section ill. B. infra.
103. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Although I believe LaFleur and Vlandis to be substantive due
process decisions in disguise, other "conclusive presumptions" cases suggest disguised
equal protection review. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 608
(1973). Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), and Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), seemed to have tolled the bell for irrebuttable presumptions
methodology. The method was always a fictionalized account of the true fourteenth
amendment story, and now that substantive due process talk has unabashedly reemerged,
the Court's need for a fictional devi<,e in its stead has, happily, run its course, See
generally Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449
(1975); Note, The lrrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1534 (1974).
104. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
431 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397,
399-400 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J. concurring); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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what is to be done with the Warren Court's strand-tangled
legacy? Must it be rejected to restore order to fourteenth amendment jurisprudence?

m.

THREE SNAPSHOTS OF THE STRANDS -

v. City of East Cleveland,

AND

Maher v. Roe, Moore
Zablocki v. Redhail

A trio of cases from the past two years highlights recent
trends and unresolved struggles in fourteenth amendment adjudication. In Maher v. Roe, 105 the liberty-equality tangle produced
inadequate analysis and an unsatisfying outcome. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 106 the pressures generated by the tangle
led to an active and controversial renewal of the romance with
substantive due process adjudication. Finally, despite Moore's
attempt to break loose from the tangle, a majority in Zablocki v.
Redhail 107 dove headlong back into the morass. A review of these
cases will set the stage for the effort in Section N to identify the
methods and values of distinguishing liberty claims from equality
claims in constitutional adjudication.

A. Maher v. Roe
At issue in Maher was the constitutionality of Connecticut's
policy permitting the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse women.
for the costs of childbirth and "medically necessary" abortions,
but forbidding their use to reimburse women for the costs of socalled nontherapeutic abortions. In an opinion by Justice Powell,
a majority of six Justices concluded that the Connecticut regulation satisfied constitutional requirements. 108
The key to Maher lies in its methodology for framing the
constitutional question(s) to be.resolved. The Court first asked
whether the Constitution, after Roe v. Wade, 109 affirmatively requires state subsidy of abortions for women too poor to bear the
cost privately. That question has both a libertarian dimension (if
all women are free to choose abortion, must the state guarantee
the power to effectuate that freedom) and an egalitarian dimension (if women of means can obtain abortions, is the state responsible for the "discrimination" that market pricing produces
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

432 U.S.
431 U.S.
434 U.S.
432 U.S.
410 U.S.

464 (1977).
494 (1977).
374 (1978).
at 474-79.
113 (1973).
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against women without means), but the Court answered in a
single conclusory assertion:
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay
the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. 110

On the facts of Maher, however, that question seemed unnecessarily broad. Connecticut had not simply ignored the medical
expense plight of pregnant women; rather, it had paid all such
expenses except those arising from so-called convenience abortions. Therefore, the Court ultimately focused its attention not on
the discrimination between rich and poor women, but on the
discrimination between poor women seeking one resolution of a
pregnancy and those seeking another .111 This, the Court declared,
"presents a question arising under the Equal Protection Clause,"
the analytic framework for which "is well settled." 112 That
"settled" framework turned out to be one wholly derived from
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 113 calling
for a finding of disadvantage to a suspect class, or impingement
"upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by
the Constitution" to trigger strict scrutiny. 114 In choosing to rely
upon Rodriguez's substantive equal protection formula, the Court
once again became trapped in the tangled strands of the fourteenth amendment.
To answer the narrower question as framed, the Court endeavored to define the fundamental right discovered in Roe v.
Wade. 115 Roe struck down a statute criminalizing most abortions,
and the Maher Court concluded that the right that Roe had vindi110. 432 U.S. at 469.
111. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage ns a
consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues ns before
to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may hove
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's'
decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortion that was not
already there.
432 U.S. at 474.
112. 432 U.S. at 470.
113. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
114. 411 U.S. at 17.
115. My discussion of Maher v. Roe proceeds on the assumption that the Maher
Court believed that Roe·v. Wade was decided correctly. Surely the Maher opinion, on its
face, offers no evidence that the Court believed otherwise. Closer analysis will indicate
that the right to terminate an ongoing pregnancy should not hove been held
"fundamental" in Roe v. Wade, see text at notes 82-92 supra and 264-65, 313, & 335-41
infra, and Maher might thus be defensible as a simple refusal to require state subsidy of
a constitutionally insignificant activity. On the Court's terms, however, Maher illustrates
the Burger Court's continuing struggle with strand separation.
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cated was a freedom from significant state-created obstacles in a
woman's path to an abortion. 116 Having thus cast Roe negatively
- the state has duties to refrain from choice-blockage, but no
affirmative duties to facilitate the choice - the Court concluded
that the right was not significantly threatened by the Connecticut
regulation because state subsidy for childbirth in no way blocked
access to an abortion. 117 The upshot of this analysis was the application of deferential rationality scrutiny, 118 a standard generally
appropriate for judicial review of resource allocation decisions.U 9
Under the placid gaze of that scrutiny, the Connecticut policy
survived as a legitimate expression of preference for childbirth
over abortion.
The Court's- analysis in Maher deserves careful attention for
several reasons. First, it confirmed and accelerated the Rodriguez
trend toward limiting the line of cases in which the Court had
seemed to indicate that "ability to pay" was not a permissible
criterion for the distribution of constitutionally significant opportunities. 120 In so doing, it squarely rejected a doctrine of fourteenth amendment "affirmative duties." 121 Second, it offered an
unusual and instructive, but inadequately elaborated; twist on
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The next two subsections of this Article analyze those facets of the Maher opinion.
Viewed most comprehensively, they reveal a partial misapprehension by the Maher majority of the separate and distinct functions of the strands of the fourteenth amendment.
116. "Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion,' as the
District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 432
U.S. at 473-74.
117. "The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles - absolute or otherwise - in
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion." 432 U.S. at 474.
118. 432 U.S. at 478.
119. "In Dandridge v. Williams, . • . despite recognition that laws and regulations
allocating welfare funds involve 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings,' we held that classifications survive equal protection challenge when a 'reasonable
basis' for the classification is shown." 432 U.S. at 479.
120. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); text at notes 122-30 infra.
121. See generally Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. RE:v. 877, 897-901 (1976); Michelman, supra note 66;
Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 199. See also Karst,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 59-64 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARV. L. RE:v. 1065 (1977).
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l. Wealth Plus Fundamental Rights The Flowering of "Monopoly Doctrine"

A significant portion of the Warren Court's equal protection
legacy revolved around the link between payment requirements
and access to constitutionally "special" opportunities. Griffin v.
Illinois, 122 which required states to furnish necessary transcripts
without charge to indigent appellants in criminal cases, laid the
initial groundwork. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 123
which invalidated Virginia's poll tax as a prerequisite to voting
in state elections, followed suit. Finally, the Burger Court in
Boddie v. Connecticut 124 held unconstitutional Connecticut's requirement that a divorce petitioner pay a $60 filing fee, on the
theory that indigency could not be allowed to block access to the
only means to dissolve a marriage relationship. Several commentators interpreted this line of doctrine broadly, inferring from it
that government could not limit the provision of a broad category
of "just wants" to those who happened to possess adequate purchasing resources. 125
In footnotes to Maher the Court limited severely the sweep
of the Griffin-Harper-Boddie precedents. Prior cases had already
refused to extend the theory to "necessities," such as housing 120
and welfare benefits. 127 In Maher, the Court tightened the vise by
characterizing Boddie 128 and Griffin 129 (and, by implication,
Harper as well) as cases with a common feature - state monopolies of processes affecting constitutional fundamentals of family
or liberty from confinement. Since the state did not monopolize
pregnancy termination opportunities, the Court believed the
Maher problem critically distinguishable.
122. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state
must furnish and compensate counsel in appeals of right).
123. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
124. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
125. Professor Michelman's Foreword, supra note 66, is particularly noteworthy in
this regard. See also J. RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Tribe, supra note 91, at 47,
For a powerful argument against such a constitutional stance, see Winter, supra note 80,
126. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972): "[T]he Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality

"
127. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
128. 432 U.S. at 469 n.5.
129. 432 U.S. at 471 n.6.
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The monopoly doctrine, first articulated in Boddie itself, 130
may have sound justification as a matter of decisional economy,
accuracy, and constitutional principle. Its premise is that the
state incurs special obligations to the indigent when it exercises
power unique to the sovereign authority. Foreclosure of statemonopolized opportunities leaves the excluded individual with
absolutely no alternative source of redress. Because individual
powerlessness is a recurring and significant theme of judicial intervention, 131 any state monopoly of a significant opportunity
appropriately triggers heightened concern over the suffering that
may be experienced by those trapped in a state of legal, political, 132 or familial deprivation so long as they remain within the
state's boundaries.
Moreover, abandonment of the monopoly concept in search
of an approach more responsive to the indigent's plight would
leave the Court with two unpalatable choices. The first would
require that the state provide or fully subsi_dize all services necessary to the exercise of preferred rights. In the first amendment
context, such a doctrine would produce an enormous and unmanageable allocation of state resources toward a socialized system
of access to expressive media. 133 The problem would be compounded by the threat to first amendment values posed by government control of such a system and by the insuperable difficulty of deciding· at what point the state's affirmative duty had
been fully satisfied. 134
130. [G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship ·in this society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for
legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages.
401 U.S. at 374. That the monopoly criterion of Boddie carries significant weight was made
clear in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). For general discussion of indigent
access to courts, see Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights, (pts. I & II), 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527.
131. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
132. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972).
133. Justice Powell alluded to this problem in Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.9. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
134. It is conceptually impossible for anyone, indigent or otherwise, to exercise expressive (or religious) freedoms to a point of "completion." Of course, one might distinguish an individual abortion in the sense that it, unlike speech, is physiologically finite.
To the extent, therefore, that the abortion claim is one for a measurable quantum ofrelief,
it is more justiciable than the comparable first amendment claim, with respect to which
minimum satisfaction would be difficult to define. It seems to me, nevertheless, that a
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The other alternative left open by rejection of the monopoly
doctrine is to explore the adequacy of the marketplace to provide
the benefit for which the state charges a fee or which the state
refuses to subsidize. Choice of that alternative would lead the
Court to demand state satisfaction of a claim if the private sector
were sufficiently unlikely to relieve the financial obstacles to access to a constitutional opportunity. This is precisely the inquiry
that the Court avoided in United States v. Kras, 135 in which it
upheld filing fees charged to persons seeking a personal bankruptcy discharge, on the ground that private settlement and release agreements were at least theoretically available to the
claimant. The refusal to probe the adequacy of "private remedies'' in Kras and Maher seems entirely correct. If the state's
obligation to subsidize abortions turns on the availability in fact
of private subsidy of the same activity, the refusal might be constitutional in some parts of a state but not in others or constitutional one day but not the next. Results of that sort clash with
legitimate state needs to plan and budget operations, and might
work as a significant disincentive to private charity - once a
court found private effects insufficient and ordered a local or
statewide government support of the activity, existing private
efforts might disappear and new ones would rarely arise. More
fundamentally, the question of the sufficiency of private services
to the poor is not amenable to principled resolution. Whether, for
example, the availability of three abortion clinics within twenty·
miles, offering half-price abortions performed by recent medical
school graduates, is an "adequate" private alternative presents a
theory of affirmative duty to satisfy claims of access to "preferred" opportunities is ren•
dered worthless, or at least horribly fractured, if it cannot move beyond the "preferred"
opportunities whose needed quantity and market price are readily ascertainable. The
provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants presents analogous problems, but
there, at least, the state has some control over the number of persons who wind up in a
position to assert the claim.
On broader theoretical grounds, speech cannot adequately be distinguished from
abortions for purposes of "wealth-plus" affirmative duty doctrine; both are "preferred
liberties," and both may require expensive third-party assistance to be effective and
adequate. Indeed, to the extent free expression is viewed as necessary for the health and
well-being of a democratic society, the claim to full subsidization by the state of speech
seems more pressing as a matter of constitutional theory than the comparable abortion
claim.
This, I know, is endlessly debatable. Is subsidized speech more socially important
than subsidized abortion? Both involve self-actualization opportunities, but speech, we
are told, advances truth and self-government as well. On the other hand, most speech
advances nothing but the speaker's breath, while all abortions have tangible results.
Apples versus oranges might be easier.
135. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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question to which courts are not capable of providing meaningful
answers. 136
Thus, Maker's reliance on the monopoly doctrine is more
than an outcome-oriented application of a limitation first suggested in Boddie. It is conceptually sound. 137 Moreover, it exposes
the problems o( "state action" lurking beneath the surface of
Maher. The "villain" of the abortion drama may not be the state
at all; an economic system that renders many women and families too poor to pay the going rate and a fee-for-service system of
medical care delivery that places financial barriers between patients and necessary care seein to be better cast for that role. It
is thus state omission, or inaction, that triggers complaints of
constitutional wrongdoing, and under prevailing state action
theory, omissions generally do not violate fourteenth amendment
proscriptions. 138
The sole exception to that assertion arises from the "public
function" theory of state action 139 · _ certain functions of government cannot be liberated from constitutional limitations, regardless of who performs them. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 140
narrowed the definition of public function to include only those
functions traditionally and exclusively associated with sovereignty, 141 and the Court's recent decision in Flagg Brothers, Inc.
v. Brooks 142 has reinforced the Jackson approach. The monopoly
doctrine of Boddie and Maher and the public function test of
Jackson and Flagg Brothers reflect shared views of the role of
136. A doctrine that required such answers solely in the context of constitutionally
fundamental opportunities might also discourage initial judicial recognition of the preferred nature of a liberty. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. R.Ev. 72, 141
(1977).
137. For a sharply contrary view of the monopoly doctrine, see Clune, supra note 66.
138. Otherwise the·state would be responsible for all private conduct, or at least all
that can be constitutionally regulated; such a result would effectively obliterate the
public-private distinction that the text of the fourteenth amendment seems to draw.
139. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Cf. Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (15th amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(15th amendment). The "shopping center" cases momentarily extended Marsh's public
function reasoning rather broadly, Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), but the Court subsequently retreated in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972), and finally retracted the extension altogether in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976).
140. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
141. 419 U.S. at 352-53.
142. 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (a warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to hi;m for storage,
as a statutorily authorized self-help remedy for nonpayment, is not performance of a
"public function").
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government and a concern for the autonomy of the private sector .143 Jackson's restricted view of which private activities are
"public," for state action purposes, recognizes that governmental
functions often possess private counterparts and refuses to constitutionalize those activities, in part from fear of injuring the private sector in the process. The monopoly doctrine reflects a parallel respect for private action and choices, since it limits judicially
mandated government competition with the private sector, leaving to the legislature the decision whether to enter the market for
a particular good or service. Thus, there exists a core of exclusively governmental activities, which the state can delegate to
private parties only with a full coterie of constitutional restrictions and which the state itself may not administer in a way that
discriminates against the poor. Outside that narrow core, however, power and efforts are appropriately shared, and private activity creatively and constructively supplements government activity. There both the demand for state subsidization and the
attempt to constitutionalize private activity threaten the partnership system, albeit in different ways. 144
This lengthy discussion of the monopoly doctrine limitation
on "wealth plus fundamental right" principles reveals that it
speaks primarily to the government's role in ordering access to
the means of effectuating substantive liberties, and only secondarily to questions of equality. Because the claims the monopoly
doctrine sanctions generally involve de facto, and not de jure,
classifications, the doctrine is not responsive to the concerns traditionally associated with equal protection review: invidious formal classifications and enforcement patterns. Indeed, Boddie and
143. The doctrines are not perfectly coincidental, however. Conceivably, the state
might monopolize a function traditionally associated with the private sector. If it did, and
operation of the function controlled access to a constitutionally fundamental opportunity,
it presumably could not explude the poor from participation. If, however, two years thereafter a private counterpart reemerged, its operations would not be subject to the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, its emergence would terminate the state monopoly and
demand a different result on the indigent's claim for free participation.
144. The state sovereignty doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), holding states immune from commerce power-based regulation of labor standards for state and municipal employees is also conceptually linked with the monopoly
doctrine. Both the monopoly doctrine and the Usery preservation of states' "freedom to
structure integral operations in the area of traditional governmental functions" enable the
state to allocate resources and plan operations without excessive fear of direct federal
intervention. Furthermore, a forewarning that monopolization of access to critical opportunities is the automatic trigger to affirmative state responsibilities to the indigent is
useful in the budgetary planning process.
145. 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
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Griffin, two leading "monopoly" cases in the field, rely on procedural due process notions explicitly, in the former case as a sole
ground of decision 145 and in the latter as an alternative. 146 If one
erroneously views the "wealth-plus" cases as resting upon the
equal protection clause, to which the monopoly doctrine seems
poorly tailored, Maher seems wrong; in my view, however, deci- .
sions concerning minimum access to constitutionally significant
opportunities rest far more persuasively on libertarian justifications, a critical conclusion obscured in the overgrowth of tangled
strands.
2. Pressures on the Liberty System - Payment
and Preference for Childbirth

The monopoly limitation on a doctrine of affirmative state
duty to satisfy the desire to exercise constitutional rights thus
serves as a complete defense to a contention that the state must
guarantee access to abortion for all who seek one. The existence
of state subsidization for the costs of childbirth is generally irrelevant to such a claim, since the "impediment" to abortions created by state refusal to subsidize is not enlarged by a state decision to pay for childbirth. 147
Connecticut's coverage of other pregnancy-related procedures does raise, however, substantial questions about the permissibility of government-financed forays into the liberties market. In Maher, Justice Powell alluded to the problem by defining
the Roe right as freedom from "unduly burdensome interference
with [a woman's] freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy," 148 and by acknowledging that Connecticut's preference "may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision." 149 He then attempted
to escape the dilemma by pointing out that the status quo of feefor-service abortions was neither created nor altered by Connecticut's preference. 150 Although Justice Powell is correct that the
status quo cffthe abortion market was unaltered by the Connecticut policy, thorough analysis cannot terminate with that observa146. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
147. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) ("The indigency that may make it
difficult - and in some cases, perhaps, impossible - for some women to have abortions
is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.")
148. 432 U.S. at 474. See note 115 supra.
149. 432 U.S. at 474.
150. 432 U.S. at 474.
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tion. The abortion market contains potential buyers as well as
sellers, and the degree of state influence on the buyers - the
holders of primary rights in the matter - is a crucial variable. rni
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions152 assumes a pivotal role in the analysis of that variable. That doctrine, applied
most frequently in the setting of first amendment interests, 103
presumptively forbids 15' the conditioning of government largesse
on the recipient's surrender of constitutional rights. Its premise
is the fragility of certain special freedoms, and its specific concern
is that government will use its economic clout to "buy up" rights
which the Constitution protects against more direct, punitive
coercion.
At first glance, the doctrine seems to fit Maher v. Roe rather
nicely. Connecticut, forbidden to outlaw abortions, opted for the
purchase of abortion rights from the poor with an offer of free care
for childbirth. On closer inspection, however, the analogy assumes complicating dimensions. A pregnant woman must actively exercise one constitutional right or another - she must
either bear her child or terminate her pregnancy. Each has a
certain medical cost attached to it. Unlike the typical first
amendment "conditions" case, in which rights are in effect surrendered for a purely economic benefit, government subsidy of
. childbearing costs encourages the exercise of a preferred liberty.
Furthermore, the long-term financial cost of bearing the child, in
both cash outlay and lost economic opportunity, heavily outweighs the financial cost of the average abortion. For a rational
woman in possession of adequate short-term purchasing re151. As a practical matter, many indigent women will f~el they have no choice but

to carry their pregnancies to term because the State will pay for the associated
medical services, even though they would have chosen to have abortions if the State
had also provided funds for that procedure. This disparity in funding by the State
clearly operates to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children they would not
otherwise choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only operate upon
the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this form of financial pressure,
0
432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966).
153. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (freedom of political thought and association).
154. The presumption can be overcome if the state shows that the condition which
limits the exercise of constitutional rights is necessary to the proper and efficient function•
ing of the overall benefit system. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (fourth
amendment does not bar conditioning AFDC benefits on recipient's consent to a "homo
visit" by a welfare caseworker); United States Civil Sorv. Commn. v. National Assn. of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (first amendment does not bar limitation on partisan
political activity by federal civil servants).
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sources, the state offer of payment for childbirth is hardly likely
to be a sufficient inducement to choose childbirth over abortion.
On the other hand, the choices confronting the indigent pregnant woman are dramatically different. Lacking the funds to opt
for abortion, given the prospect of cash to defray childbirth expenses, and trapped by the immediacy of her dilemma, she may
find her judgment about long-term costs and benefits clouded or
tragically irrelevant to her plight in the here-and-now. She may
choose childbearing (the more expensive long-run option) over
abortion simply because only the former will meet her most pressing cash flow needs.
This suggests that the state subsidy payment for childbirth
places unmistakable pressure on a system of free choice in matters of procreation. In Maher, however, Justice Powell rejected
the analogy to a classic ,unconstitutional conditions case,
Sherbert v. Verner, 155 where the Court had held it unconstitutional to condition receipt of unemployment benefits on a person's surrender of the right to abstain for religious reasons from
Saturday work. Justice Powell distinguished Sherbert as having
arisen in "the significantly different context of a constitutionally
imposed 'governmental obligation of neutrality' in religious matters."156 He argued further that payment for childbirth and not
abortion was indistinguishable from public funding of government-operated schools without any corresponding subsidy to
private schools.1 57 Although both points are relevant, neither
responds directly to the question raised by the precise facts of
Maher: If government must be neutral with respect to some_ but
not all private choices of liberty exercise, is the abortion choice
one that calls forth neutrality requirements?
Arguments have been maintained that abortion questions
are so tied up with the views of organized religion that the religious neutrality requirements of the Constitution ought to be
155. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
156. 432 U.S. at 475 n.8, (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)}.
157. 432 U.S. at 477. The establishment clause bars most forms of government financial assistance to elementary and secondary private schools with religious affiliation. See,
e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). The establishment clause barrier surely weakens any argument that government spending for schools must be perfectly even-handed, even though it is evident that
the existence of public schools 1) provides tough competition for private schools, and 2)
may influence a parent's choice away from the constitutionally protected private school
option.
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controlling. 158 The Court's studious avoidance of that theory in
Roe u. Wade, however, together with its inherent difficulties, 169
preclude any serious reliance upon it in criticizing Maher. Commentators have argued further that payment for childbirth and
not abortion violates the government's obligation to remain neutral in cases where one must choose between two alternatives,
each of constitutional dimension. 180 By that standard, Connecticut's policy is doubly damned - it generates financial pressure
to forego abortion and it transmits the message that the body
politic disapproves the abortion choice. The latter point is significant enough that it should have led to a contrary outcome in
Maher. Unlike public funding of publicly controlled schools,
which manifests no social or moral condemnation of those who
select private education, the message delivered by the Connecticut policy is, assuming the validity of Roe, a constitutionally
unacceptable one. 181 And to its impoverished addressees, the dollar medium of that message can be telling indeed.
Invalidation of Connecticut's preference and payment for
childbirth would not, of course, guarantee state subsidy of abortions. The state might eliminate all payment for pregnancyrelated services rather than expand its coverage to include pregnancy termination, and that, I have argued above, would not
violate the Constitution. 182 Unhappy a concluding note as that
might be, it underscores my essential point. Maher u. Roe was a
case about the role of government in the liberty system, not about
, inequalities for which government can be held constitutionally
responsible. The tangled strands of substantive equal protection
formulations either blocked full recognition of that insight by the
Maher majority or enabled them to avoid it while seemingly holding fast to prevailing fourteenth amendment methodology. Maher
is glaring evidence that the elaborate linkage of liberty and equality in the Court's work of the past twenty-five years can quell
revolutions as easily as it can arm them.
The Maher majority's devotion to equal protection clause
158. Professor Tribe once advanced that view, see L. TRmE, supra note 1, at 928 & n,
54, but has since recanted. Id. at 928.
159. Id. at 928-29.
160. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 72, 137, 145-46 (1977).
See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1432 (1974).
161. See Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN D1Eoo L. REV.
1155, 1157 n. 10 (1978).
162. It might, however, violate a state's statutory obligation to provide Medicaid
assistance to an extent "consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX]." 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(17) (1976).
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theory is still less defensible when that case is compared with
Moore v. City of East Cleveland 163 and Zablocki v. Redhail. 164 In
those, our next two snapshot cases, several Justices from the
Maher majority proclaimed substantive due process theories of
fundamental liberty interests to be preferred over comparable
equal protection theories as grounds of fourteenth amendment
decision. That apparent recrossing of strands may contain a significant hint about the direction of fourteenth amendment doctrine in the near future.

B. Moore v: City of East Cleveland
It is a rare and significant occasion when the Supreme Court
writes self-consciously about its choices of doctrine and theory,
and self-consciousness of that sort illuminates at high levels of
candlepower when it is accompanied by judicial disagreement.
Such was the case in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 165 in which
the Court invalidated, on pure substantive due process grounds,
an East Cleveland zoning ordinance that limited dwelling unit
occupancy to members of a "family." 166 The ordinance defined
family in a way that excluded a wide variety of relatives of the
head of the household. In particular, the ordinance prohibited
occupancy by grandchildren of the head of the household, with
an exception for the children of one (but only one) dependent
child of the household head.
Inez Moore shared a household in East Cleveland with a son,
his offspring, and a grandson by another of her children. After
city officials gave her notice of the ordinance and she failed to
comply with it or seek administrative relief from its strictures, 167
she was charged with and convicted of a violation. A closely divided Supreme co·urt reversed the conviction and invalidated the
ordinance. In an opinion for a plurality of four, 168 Justice Powell
concluded that the East Cleveland ordinance failed to satisfy the
substantive requirements of the fourteenth amendment:s due
163. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
164. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
165. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
166. See 431 U.S. at 496 n. 2.
167. This failure to exhaust administrative remedies led Chief Justice Burger to
conclude that Moore's claim should have been dismissed and the substantive constitutional merits never reached. 431 U.S. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). None of the other
Justices agreed, and the case law leans strongly in their direction. See, e.g., King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
168. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell formed the plurality.
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process clause. Viewing the case as implicating the liberty to
structure extended family living arrangements, the plurality concluded that the East Cleveland ordinance must be "examine[d]
carefully" for the "importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." 169 That formulation of a substantive due process review standard left a bit to be desired, for nowhere does the plurality indicate how important the state's objectives must be nor how
well advanced by the ordinance. Nevertheless, the latter half of
this test proved fatal: the plurality concluded that the ordinance
served "marginally, at best" the interests in preserving "the character of a single-family neighborhood" 170 proffered by East Cleveland.171
Three of the four dissenting Justices discussed the merits in
Moore. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist argued that substantive
due process d,octrine should be limited to those interests "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," 172 and concluded that Moore's
interest in living with her children and grandchildren was not of
169. 431 U.S. at 499.
170. The phrase is Justice White's, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). Although
the purpose of the ordinance might be formulated in "family-neutral" terms ( e.g., control
of population density, traffic congestion, or school-age population), Justice White's attribution of purpose seems most consistent with the precise family-splitting terms used in
the ordinance. Those terms are the best evidence of the provision's dominant purpose.
171. 431 U.S. at 500. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the East
Cleveland ordinance worked an unconstitutional property deprivation. He cited approvingly several state court opinions that, he claimed, evinced a trend in that direction. 431
U.S. at 516-21 nn.8-16. Many of those cases involved statutory interpretations of "family"
in a zoning ordinance so as not to prohibit occupancy by groups, unrelated by blood or
marriage, that cohabited for important and legitimate purposes. They included City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,313 N.E.2d 756,357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (group
home licensed by the state to care for abandoned and neglected children "conforms to the
purpose" of an ordinance restricting occupancy to families), cited at 431 U.S. at 517 n.9,
and Missionaries of Our Lady v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627
(1954) (household of six priests and two lay brothers are a "family" for purposes of the
ordinance), cited at 431 U.S. at 519 n.13. Other cases cited by Justice Stevens involved
limiting· interpretations of state-wide zoning enabling statues. See City of Des Plaines v.
Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (city not authorized by state lnw to limit
occupancy to related persons), cited at 431 U.S. at 516 n.8. While courts in these cases
were no doubt influenced by substantive due process notions of liberty interests in structuring a household and property interests in the use to which property is put, only one
case from a court of last resort cited by Justice Stevens squarely held a single-family
ordinance in violation of the due process clause on grounds of property deprivation. Kirsh
Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241,281 A.2d 513 (1971), cited at 431 U.S.
at 517 n.10. See generally Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427,
1568-78 (1978).
172. 431 U.S. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162
(1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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that magnitude. Justice White, in a more elaborate dissent, 173
traced the history of substantive due process ideas, cautioned
against the abuses of power likely to be engendered by uncritical
employment of such theories, 174 and concluded that the deprivation of Moore's liberty and property worked by the East Cleveland ordinance was of the sort that any rational government justification would validate. Finding such justification in East Cleveland's objective of maintaining family-oriented neighborhoods,
Justice White concluded that both the due process clause175 and
the equal protection clause 176 had been satisfied.
Moore was a remarkable decision. Its choice of rationale reversed a pattern that had endured for four decades: it was the
first decision since the 1937 revolution to invalidate a statute on
naked substantive due process grounds 177 when equal protection
grounds seemed readily available. Griswold and Roe, the leading
substantive due process cases of the past forty years, had not
presented such alternatives; in both cases, the complained-of prohibition swept broadly across the state's entire population, and
thus offered no classification readily subject to equal protection
attack. In Moore, by contrast, the "family" definition in the ordinance seemed perfect for invalidation as an arbitrary classification: the limitation of permitted resident grandchildren to those
in one and only one descendant line is rather remote from a concern to protect the character of a single-family neighborhood. 178
The plurality opinion stood at least thirty years of conventional
wisdom on its head by adopting a substantive due process theory
and proclaiming in a one-sentence footnote that the due process
holding rendered it unnecessary for the Court to reach the equal
protection claims made in the case. 179
•
The notion that due process clause doctrine should be preferred to equal protection clause analysis is an intriguing one. 180
173. 431 U.S. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
174. 431 U.S. at 542-44.
175. 431 U.S. at 547-51.
176. 431 U.S. at 550-51.
f
177. Conventional wisdom was strongly to the effect that substantive due process,
wholly divorced from the Bill of Rights, was dead and buried. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 596-97 (1977); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). But see
text at notes 82-89 supra.
178. See note 170 supra. The city might have been on safer equal protection ground
if it had excluded all grandchildren, although the Moore plurality's due process theory
would presumably have been no less hostile to such a tack.
179. 431 U.S. at 496 n.3.
180. Moore is also remarkable for its controversial extension of family autonomy
rights. Prior family autonomy cases had only concerned relationships of parent and child.
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Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 181 had counseled precisely to the contrary:
The burden should rest heavily upon one who. would persuade
us to use the due process clause to strike down a substantive law
or ordinance . . . . Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due
process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct
which many people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal_protection clause, on the other hand,
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the
subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact. 182

It remains unclear whether the Moore plurality was indifferent to Justice Jackson's concern for the relative consequences of
due process versus equal protection invalidation. The theories of
Moore, which criticize only the peculiar means chosen, do not
leave ungovernable the problem of population density .183 If, however, the "objectionable" conduct that troubled East Cleveland
was the practice of extending families within a household, the
Jackson dictum has been ignored. It is entirely possible that the
Court employed the theories of Moore fully aware of their sweeping consequences. If so, the Court may have been consciously
opting for the broad effects that substantive due process holdings
are likely to produce rather than the narrower, more restrained
effects that Justice Jackson found more acceptable.
Comparing Moore with Skinner v. Oklahoma 184 may illustrate the different consequences of due process and equal protection intervention. Skinner invalidated, on equal protection
grounds, an Oklahoma statute that· required sterilization of certain classes of habitual criminal offenders. The Supreme Court
concluded that the statute's coverage of larceny offenders such as
Skinner, coupled with its exemption of other classes of thieves,
including embezzlers, constituted an "invidious discrimination. "185 The Court was aided toward that conclusion by the
premise that reproductive freedom is a "basic civil right" 186 whose
Moore's household included two grandchildren, both of whom had at least one living
parent. 431 U.S. at 496-97.
181. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949).
182. 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring).
183. Communities remain free to regulate density directly (i.e., number of people per
square foot of usable space), and to prohibit at least some groups of unrelated persons from
sharing a household. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boreas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally
Developments in the Law, supra note 171, at 1443-62.
184. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
185. 316 U.S. at 541.
186. 316 U.S. at 541.
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discriminatory abridgment receives unusually exacting judicial
inquiry. Skinner's 1942 vintage helps to explain why the Court
preferred a relatively narrow equal protection ground of decision
to a broader preferred liberty theory that would have impugned
all involuntary sterilization schemes. No matter how serious the
issue, the Court presumably was unwilling to reinstate substantive activism under the due process clause only five years after
its repudiation. 187 Nevertheless, Skinner has been criticized for
the narrowness of its approach and for its consequent failure to
protect other classes of persons, criminal offenders and otherwise,
whose reproductive interests were potentially threatened by sterilization schemes. 188
Skinner was unrestrained in its vigorous protection of a nontextual liberty, yet cautious in its grounds that went no farther
than the particular case at hand. Moore's reversal of the strand
preference can be viewed as an inversion of the Court's restraint
priorities as well. The decision is deferential toward state zoning
objectives - communities remain free to control population
density and neighborhood character, so long as the definition of
appropriate living units does not sever family· connections. Yet
the due process clause theory, with its strict attention to the
means used to achieve those ends, delivers the message of Moore
in a way unlikely to give rise to further litigation on the point. 189
If Moore had chosen the equal protection route, it might have
invalidated the East Cleveland ordinance while suggesting the
permissibility of other, less arbitrary definitions of "family". Instead, Moore holds that families, defined by blood and marriage
relations, cannot be carved up unless such limitations are critically necessary to achieve substantial zoning objectives. Thus,
unlike the Skinner equal protection approach, which at the time
left room for doubt whether classes of habitual criminals could be
sterilized, the Moore due process methodology clearly marks the
extended family as an institution heavily protected against direct
municipal regulation.
Although Moore's machete leaves open fewer questions than
187. That is, the majority was unwilling. Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justice Jack-'
son, concurred in Skinner on substantive due process grounds. 316 U.S. at 544 (Stone, '
C.J., concurring).
188. See Arthur Garfield Hays Conference, The Proper Role of the United States
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 457, 471-72 (1964) (remarks of
Professor Foote).
189. Cf. Dixon, supra note 11, at 87 (the Court decided Roe v. Wade in a way "designed . . . to regulate the field in such detail as to minimize future questions and litigation.").
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Skinner's scalpel, that may not have been what principally motivated the Moore majority to choose due process methodology. A
more persuasive speculation, perhaps, is that at.least three of the
five Justices voting to invalidate the East Cleveland ordinance
wanted most to avoid manufacturing arrows for the substantive
equal protection bow. 190 The influence of Justice Marshall's sliding scale of equal protection, 191 which correlates the review standard with the importance of the claimed interest, would have
been buttressed had the Court used the liberty to structure family
living arrangements to trigger stringent equal protection review.
By avoiding the equal protection ground, the majority was able
to fortify the fourteenth amendment barricade without reinforcing the sliding scale or other, less flexible, theories of substantive
equal protection. 192
The contrast between Moore and Maher, viewed from this
perspective, is striking. In Maher, a Court intent on upholding
the Connecticut policy chose to leave the strands tangled; in
Moore, it preferred to untangle in order to invalidate. The Court
thus continued to make substantive value choices in fourteenth
amendment adjudication, but chose to make new advances in the
protection of substantive rights in the name of the due process
clause. It left the structure and rhetoric of substantive equal protection formally intact, however, perhaps to preserve the underpinnings of important Warren Court work, to avoid abrupt doctrinal discontinuities, or to retain judicial flexibility. Whatever
the explanation, the Maher-Moore sequence seems a tentative
but significant step in the untangling process currently underway.
190. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens supported the disarmament. Unperturbed, Justice Marshall remains an avowea proponent of substantive equal protection,
see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and Justice Brennan has joined in, 411 U.S. at 62, although at times he has
taken pains to mask his preference in a "strict rationality" formula of some sort. See
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). Intriguingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall also submitted a concurring opinion in Moore, emphasizing the role of the extended family in the cultural patterns
of nonwhite minorities. 431 U.S. at 507-11. This attempted relinkage of Moore to equal
protection seems unpersuasive in face of East Cleveland's predominantly nonwhite character. If any "racial discrimination" was operating, it was self-imposed.
191. See note 99 supra.
192. The Rodriguez formulation, see text at notes 83-97 supra, articulated a pure
"two-tier" theory, providing strict scrutiny of all suspect classifications and all classifications impinging upon "fundamental interests." An equal protection approach in Moore
might have held family-structuring interests to be fundamental for this purpose, See
generally Gunther, supra note 98.
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The Court's use of the substantive due process strand in
Moore forced it to venture once again into the thicket of defining
fundamental liberties. 193 The opinions in Moore offer a variety of
approaches to determining which rights merit the active protection of substantive due process. 194 First, although the Justices
disagreed about the governing standard by which to evaluate
claims that particular liberty interests are fundamental, 195 not
one opposed the continued employment of substantive due process to protect some liberties wholly removed from the Bill of
Rights. Seco~d, the terms of the review standard employed by the
Moore plurality suggest that the Court is finally prepared to open
formally an "intermediate wing" of substantive due process review. Third, the fight over substantive due process standards
reveals two distinct but similar versions of an "ordered liberty"
193. See text at notes 2-8 supra.
194. The vigorous protection of the extended family in Moore expands the class of
preferred nontextual liberties, in result if not in theory. Moore moves beyond Griswold
and Roe, which involved procreative freedom of choice, as well as beyond Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the Court revived the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to strike down a statute that proscribed awarding custody of an illegitimate child to
the father. Stanley's protection of the relationship between biological parent and child was
not a particularly bold leap. The biological choice to conceive and the emotional choice
to perform the parental function are hardly unrelated. In the absence of constitutional
protection of the latter choice, the protection of the former in Skinner, Griswold, and Roe
is robbed of a substantial portion of its significance. Viewed in that light, the statutory
prohibition of custody can be seen as a retroactive "sterilization," and, as such, fully
within the scope of the procreative freedom principle.
The family restrictions imposed by East Cleveland, however, did not intrude on the
relationship between parent and minor child. Both the majority and the dissent in Moore
seemed acutely aware of the extension of the family privacy notion being sought by the
petitioners. In the end, the battle reduced to a disagreement about the appropriateness
of judicial elevation to special status of new elements of liberty. The plurality viewed
freedom to structure an extended family as a critical element of our cultural heritage,
hence deserving extraordinary judicial protection:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.
431 U.S. at 504. Several dissenting Justices, more deeply troubled by any new applications
of substantive due process doctrine, thought the case failed to present the harm to vital
interests that is necessary to overcome the heavy presumption against such new applications:
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen
and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise to
[the] level [of preferred liberty]. To equate this interest with the fundamental
decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited substantive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.
431 U.S. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In my view, developed at length in Section N.
A. below, those Justices seriously and inappropriately devalued Moore's claim.
195. See note 194 supra.
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standard articulated in Palko 196 and elaborated in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 197 One version - that of the Moore
dissenters - has no apparent unifying theory, It does appear,
however, to accept existing substantive due process decisions,
like Roe, and to recognize new claims closely analogous to those
already recognized. 198 The other version - that of the Moore plurality - seems to depend on the historical understanding of liberty:
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society." Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down m~y of our most cherished values, moral and cultural. 100

The problem of defining standards for ascertaining fundamental liberties is an old one. Its difficulty has led judges200 and
commentators201 alike to conclude that defensible standards do
not exist and that substantive due process adjudication is inescapably an abuse of power. Indeed, one of the attractions of substantive equal protection, in its heyday, was the perception that
notions of constitutional equality possessed an intrinsic set of
standards. The recent reduction in substantive equal protection
activism, coupled with the rebirth of substantive due process
activism, has revived the search for standards, and the quest
must be vigorously pursued. This century's constitutional law is
overpowering tes_timony to the allure and might of substantive
due process. 202 The Court will not abandon it, and a fabric of
expectations has been woven around it; the task is to confine it
and make it as amenable to defensible principle as possible.
Moore started down that path, 203 but major advances in constitu196. See text at notes 43-46 supra.
197. 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
198. 431 U.S. at 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
199. 431 U.S. at 503-04 (citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-513 (1965) (Black J.
dissenting).
' '
201. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword, supra note 9.
202. See A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT at xx
(1976).
203. In Section IV, I will propose a standard of fundamentality which builds upon
the foundations of Moore and provides a mode of analysis more subject to principled
application.
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tional law are often marked more by fits and starts than by graceful strides. The third snapshot in this brief album is therefore not
surprising, for it pictures the strands of the fourteenth amendment rewoven in a knot twisted enough to warm a sailor's heart.
C. Zablocki v. Redhail

Zablocki v. Redhail, 204 decided in January 1978, illustrates
perfectly the complex interweaving of and subtle rivalry between
liberty and equality themes in fourteenth amendment adjudication. The Wisconsin statute challenged in Zablocki provided that
a person with outstanding court-ordered support obligations to
minor children not in his custody could not obtain a license to
marry absent permission from a state court. The court could
grant the license only if the petitioner demonstrated at a hearing
that 1) all prior court-ordered obligations had been satisfied, and
2) the minor child beneficiary of the obligation was not then, and
was not likely to become, a public charge. 205
Roger Redhail, plaintiff in the case, told a tale of many woes.
He had fathered an infant girl out of wedlock in 1971. As a result,
he faced a paternity suit in 1972 in which he admitted paternity
and was ordered by the Milwaukee County Court to pay $109 per
month for child support. For the next two years Redhail was
"unemployed and indigent, " 206 and made no payments on his
daughter's behalf. In the fall of 1974, Redhail sought a license to
marry another woman, who was pregnant with his child. After the
clerk denied the license application in light of the statute described above, Redhail and his prospective bride sought federal
injunctive relief against the scheme. Redhail did not seek the
hearing provided in the statute, but the state conceded that such
a petition would have been futile. Redhail had an undisputed
arrearage of over $3,000, and even if he met his monthly obligation, his daughter would be, as she had been since birth, a recipient of public assistance.
In an opinion for a majority of the Court, Justice Marshall
held that the Wisconsin marriage bar violated the equal protection clause. His opinion, true to the substantive emphasis of his
sliding scale theories, made the nature of the right impeded more
significant than the nature of the classification drawn. Proceed204. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
205. The statute is set out in the Court's opinion. 434 U.S. at 375-77 n.1.
206. 434 U.S. at 378.
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ing from the premise that marriage is a fundamental right, Justice Marshall invoked an active review standard, one which demanded a close relationship between the marriage prohibition
and "sufficiently important state interests." 207 The statute, not
surprisingly, failed the test. Although the opinion conceded the
importance of ensuring compliance with family support obligations, it found the Wisconsin scheme too heavy a burden on marriage formation and insufficiently likely to increase the rate of
compliance.
Three separate concurring opinions were filed in Zablocki.
Justice Stevens concurred on equal protection grounds, 208 Justice
Powell concurred on both equal protection and substantive due
process grounds, 209 and Justice Stewart agreed with the result
solely on due process grounds. 210 Justice Stewart spoke directly
and at some length about the problem of tangled strands:
In an opinion of the Court half a century ago, Justice Holmes
described an equal protection claim as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments." ... Today equal protection doctrine
has become the Court's chief instrument for invalidating state
laws. Yet, in a case like this one, the doctrine is no more than
substantive due process by another name.
Although the Court purports to examine the bases for legislative classifications and to compare the treatment of legislatively
defined groups, it actually erects substantive limitations on what
· States may do. Thus, the effect of the Court's decision in this case
is not to require Wisconsin to draw its legislative classifications
with greater precision or to afford similar treatment to similarly
situated persons. Rather, the message of the Court's opinion is that
Wisconsin may not use its control over marriage to achieve the
objectives of the state statute. Such restrictions on basic governmental power are at the heart of substantive due process.
The Court is understandably reluctant to rely on substantive
due process . . . . But to embrace the essence of that doctrine
under the guise of equal protection serves no purpose but obfuscation. . . .
To conceal this appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or
thoughtless application of misfocused doctrine. To bring it into the
open forces a healthy and responsible recognition of the nature and
purpose of the extreme power we wield when, in invalidating a
state law in the name of the Constitution, we invalidate pro tanto
207.
208.
209.
210.

434 U.S.
434 U.S.
434 U.S.
434 U.S.

at 388.
at 403.
at 396.
at 391.
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the process of representative democracy in one of the sovereign
States of the Union. 211
•

The tangling in Zablocki was even worse than Justice Stewart indicated. The majority opinion, resting wholly on the equal
protection clause, seems almost completely unconcerned with
questions of "classification" or "discrimination." The de facto
wealth classification generated by the Wisconsin scheme - the
very poor were blocked from marriage regardless of their satisfaction of support obligations - received only the scantiest attention.212 Given the prominence of "wealth plus fundamental right"
reasoning and rhetoric in Warren Court equal protection decisions,213 abstinence from that approach in Zablocki is striking. It
suggests that wealth, or lack of it, may perhaps return to the
status of "constitutional irrelevance" it once apparently enjoyed.214
Paradoxically undercutting that suggestion, however, is the
failure of those who perceived the Zablocki majority's tangle to
avoid their own. Although Justices Stewart and Powell urged a
due process clause theory upon the Court, both laid controlling
emphasis on the Wisconsin statute's disproportionate burden
upon the indigent. 215 That an equality-centered theme of a decade
past can be transformed magically into a liberty-centered theme
of the moment is marvelous testimony to the staying power of
arguments to protect the poor, but it simultaneously indicates
that the theoretical basis of much of the Warren Court's substantive equal protection effort is sorely in need of reexamination.
The Zablocki plot thickens when one notices that Justices
Powell and Stewart each expressed concern about the consequences of the Zablocki holding for other state-created barriers
to marriage, such as limitations based on age or consanguinity.
211. 434 U.S. at 395-96.
212. 434 U.S. at 387.
213. See text at notes 122-25 supra.
214. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Justice Jackson was, of course, concerned about the de jure discrimination against the
poor challenged in Edwards, and, in that context, indigency was not an "irrelevance." His
point, I think, was that states must treat it as an irrelevance, or, more accurately, cannot
create sanctions and punishments which are triggered explicitly by indigent status. What
Jackson thus intended is something like what the elder Justice Harlan intended when he
said the Constitution is "color-blind," Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where he presumably meant to say that the Constitution colorconsciously requires the states to be color-blind.
215. 434 U.S. at 393-95 (Stewart, J., concurring); 434 U.S. at 400-02 (Powell, J.,
concurring).

1026

Michigan Law Review

lVol. 77:981

Both Justices warned that Zablocki might be read to require"
extraordinary state justification for such time-honored restrictions. But notwithstanding their conclusory say-sos, neither clarified how or why a substantive due process theory would be less
destructive of traditional marriage impediments than a substantive equal protection theory fueled by the same sensitivity to
restrictions on marriage formation. 216
Given the surprising and doctrinally unnecessary resurrection of substantive due process in Moore, why did the Zablocki
Court revert to substantive equal protection labels? The family
formation context of Zablocki made it a less controversial setting
for the invocation of a substantive due process theory than Moore
- marriage barriers had, as an alternative ground of decision in
Loving v. Virginia, 217 been under due process clause clouds before,
Moore, in contrast, demanded a much greater extension of prior
holdings to qualify as a legitimate preferred liberty claim. Two
plausible explanations for this enigmatic doctrinal flip-flop present themselves. A primary goal of several members of the Court
appears to be flexibility - the avoidance of rigid formulae that
might produce unpalatable results in unforeseeable cases. The
disagreement about choice of strands may thus be only a dispute
over which approach best preserves open discretion and the power
to decide cases ad hoc. For some, that discretion is preserved by
fluid notions of the substance of equal protection; for others, the
erratic quality of due process clause intervention is better suited
to the task. A more frightening explanation for the MooreZablocki inconsistency is that the Justices think the choice of
doctrine insignificant, either because all that counts is mustering
a majority for a given result or because the distinct functions of
the strands have long been blurred. Either way, constitutional
law is done a great disservice. Liberty against government and
equality under the law are not fungible concepts, and the majesty
of both is sullied by attempts to treat them as such. The strands
must be untangled.
216. A due process theory might be more solicitous of such traditions, for reasons
developed in Section IV.A., infra. The trick is to take care to define the fundamental
right in a way that preserves what ought to be preserved. An equality-centered approach
has trouble doing that, but I hope to show that a straightforward liberty approach,
properly understood and employed, might be a sensitive enough instrument. See text at
notes 324-25 infra.
217. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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The trials and errors of history and the evolution of constitutional values are responsible in tandem for the complex modern
interplay between liberty and equality in fourteenth amendment
adjudication, and the interplay has at times served valuable purposes. Beyond question, certain conceptions of liberty and equality are mutually reinforcing. Equality of opportunity, unhampered by invidious discrimination, may lead to enhanced economic status and a more secm:e base from which to exercise liberty interests. Similarly, the unfettered exercise of various liberties may operate to enhance both equality of opportunity and the
individual belief that we are a society oflegal and political equals.
These notions of mutual reinforcement do not, however, always
require specific doctrinal embodiment. Although liberty and
equality are, operationally, inextricably linked, consistency of
decision, persuasiveness of judicial reasoning, and maintenance
of appropriate institutional restraints would all be enhanced by
their separation theoretically. The pretended death of substantive due process has long impeded any candid attempt to separate; its recent resurrection in Moore and the subsequent retangling in Zablocki suggest that the time is. ripe for the effort that
follows.·

A. The Multiple Meanings of Liberty
By the turn of the century, the theory of liberty protected by
the fourteenth amendment was simple yet expansive. Although
liberty was viewed as negative - a right to be let alone - it
embraced every important interest valued by sensible people. 218
In one oft-cited formulation, it included the' "right[s] of the
individual . . . to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 219 The Court drew no lines among those privileges; contracting to work in excess of sixty hours per week was neither a
greater nor lesser exercise of liberty than studying a foreign language, marrying, or selling a product at a price the unregulated
market would bear. Because the Court considered all liberties
equal in their claims to due process clause protection, the Court
218. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
405, 411-16 (1977).

219. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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demanded, in theory, an unchanging degree of justification220
from a state that imposed any liberty restriction. Although history and intuition suggest that, in fact, the Court engaged in
substantive due process review at different degrees of intensity,
the theory upon which such review rested admitted of no "sliding
scales" or tests of "fundamentality." Liberty was liberty was liberty, and it had to be protected against invasion on improper
grounds.
Post-1937 developments have complicated enormously the
meaning of liberty protected by the due process clause. One of the
more dramatic complications has been the separation of
"procedural due process" from "substantive due process" liberties. For purposes of procedural due process, the term "liberty"
comprises the specifics of the Bill of Rights, 221 freedom from physical restraints, 222 and an ill-defined group of interests created by
state laws. 223 That, at least, is the definition of procedural due
process liberty enunciated in Paul v. Davis 224 - a definition that
despite persuasive calls of "Halt! " 225 seems destined to endure220
for the foreseeable future.
Although the Court has appeared unwilling to explain the
220. Although the Court presented the standard in a variety of verbal cloaks, it
required essentially a "direct and substantial" relationship between the restriction and
some legitimate aim of the police power. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905).
221. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 n.5 (1976) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961)).
222. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,674 (1977) (corporal punishment in public
schools implicates liberty, despite neither alteration in state law status nor possible eighth
amendment violation). Despite Ingraham's posture as a procedural due process case, its
refusal to require prior hearings on whether the student committed the "offense" leading
to the punishment and its reliance on state law remedies for "excessive" punishment mark
it as a case -protecting substantive rights as much as if not more than procedural ones.
For what the Court really seemed to be holding was that states must provide a remedy in
tort for public school students who are excessively (that is, disproportionately) punished,
a requirement that can emerge only from an underlying recognition of an inviolable federal
constitutional right of a student not to be so treated.
223. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). This final group of liberties seems
difficult to distinguish conceptually from "property" entitlements of the sort covered by
the theory of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). For the Court's most recent
struggle with the problem of appropriate sources of "liberty," see the range of opinions in
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979).
224. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
225. Monaghan, supra note 218, at 424-34. See also Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:
A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293, 322-28 (1976).
226. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977) (assumed, without deciding, that source of foster parents' "liberty" interests
is state law).
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distinction, the meaning of "liberty" in the substantive due process setting springs from different roots. Paul's positivism is not
controlling; indeed, a footnote to Paul explicitly distinguishes
liberty for procedural due process purposes from liberty for substantive purposes. 227 For the latter, liberty encompasses a far
broader range of interests; it may yet, for all we know, include all
those "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 228 And the source of these
interests is federal constitutional law; if a new state entered the
Union and simultaneously criminalized the act of bearing a child,
one could have no doubt that "liberty" had been endangered,
even though state law entitlement to the liberty had ceased to
exist.
The distinction in methodology between procedural and substantive due process is magnified at the second stage of analysis.
For, unlike the all-inclusive theory of the Lochner era that held
all liberties equally inviolable, and unlike the procedural due
process theory that assesses the weight of any protected interest
in a refined way for purposes of "balancing," 229 modern substan227. "[The Court's] discussion [of the source of liberty interests] is limited to
consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and is not intended
to describe those substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed
within the concept of 'liberty' expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S. at 710
n.5.
The only sensible explanation for holding a positivist view of liberty for procedural
due process purposes, while simultaneously maintaining an independent federal constitutional view for substantive purposes, is that of minimizing the intrusion of federal constitutional law on the day-to-day operations of state and municipal institutions. For instance, a state law may impinge upon substantive liberty but be defensible under prevailing doctrine as rationally justifiable. Thus, the law's substantive constitutionality, if ever
challenged, can usually be authoritatively determined in a single proceeding. Application
of that law to many parties, however, may give rise to countless encounters between state
officials and private citizens. In turn, under a broad, nonpositivist view of procedural due
process liberty, each such encounter could trigger requirements of notice and opportunities to be heard. The Court, despite the apparent "promise" of Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), seems eager to avoid that consequence. See, e.g., Board of Curators
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic dismissal from state medical school, even if a
deprivation of liberty or property, does not trigger a right to a hearing under the fourteenth
amendment); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976).
228. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
229. To determine the level of "process that is due" a liberty protected by procedural
guarantees, a court assigns weights to the individual's interests and balances them against
the state's interest in their summary deprivation. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976); See also Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977). Unlike the question ofliberty vel non, the task of weighing
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tive due process theory has a distinct all-or-nothing quality to it.
Most liberties lacking textual support are of the garden variety
- like liberty of contract - and thus their deprivation is constitutional if rationally necessary to the achievement of a public
good. 230 Several select liberties, on the other hand, have attained
the status of "fundamental" or "preferred," with the consequence
that the Constitution permits a state to abridge them only if it
can demonstrate an extraordinary justification. 231 Because the
review standard for ordinary liberties is so deferential, and the
standard for preferred liberties so rigid, outcomes are ordained by
the designation of "preferred" or not. 232 For procedural purposes,
liberties may weigh anything from a gram to a ton; for substantive purposes, they must weigh either a microgram or a megaton.
The volatility and, on occasion, the seemingly anti-democratic
consequences of this latter mode of classifying liberties bespeak
the overwhelming necessity to discover a sound theory to justify
its existence and guide its application.
1. Substantive Rights -

The Sources of Preferred Liberty

Preferred liberties in constitutional law generally, and in the
substantive due process side of the fourteenth amendment specifically, have flowed from three major sources. Two of those sources
derive from the Constitution itself; the parentage of the third
remains in doubt.
takes place on a scale with an infinite number of gradations. Thus, in the judicial response
to the question of "what process is due," subtle and refined judgments are permitted and,
quite frequently, are required. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), with
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
230. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). Some commentators, most notably Judge (then Professor) Linde in Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976), have argued that "rationality" review is useless and senseless.
Nevertheless, the rationality standard is an extremely "settled" principle, at least insofar
as such principles are discoverable from the face of judicial opinions. Whether it is one of
those requirements of constitutional Jaw that courts cannot enforce, but legislatures
should take seriously, is a question with which others may grappie. Judge Linde, for one,
does not see the requirement as sensible even at that level. Id. at 222-35. See generally
Sager, Fair Measure: Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV, L. REV. 1212 (1978);
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 585 (1975).
231. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 155 (1973) (restrictions on abortion justifiable only upon a showing of necessity to the accomplishment of compelling state interests).
Dissenting in Moore, Justice White articulated precisely this dichotomy of substantive
due process standards. 432 U.S. at 542-44.
. 232. Equal protection doctrine had, of course, its comparable period of development.
See Gunther, supra note 98, at 10; Developments in the Law, supra note 56, at 1127-28.
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a. Sources within the document - text and structure. The
principal source of preferred liberties, of course, has been the Bill
of Rights, incorporated in the due process clause. Although the
relationship between Bill safeguards and state governmental
power has sparked fascinating and seemingly endless controversy, 233 the proposition that many provisions of the Bill impose
limitations on- states234 coextensive with the limitations they impose on the federal government is a settled one. 235 Duncan v.
Louisiana, 236 the Court's most recent word on how to decide which
Bill guarantees apply to the states, teaches that the test of incorporation is whether the guarantee is necessary "to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty. " 237
A second source of preferred liberty has been the constitutional structure and the values that-structure implies. Predominantly structural concerns have animated the Court's protection
of the right of interstate travel; 238 the open federal union implicit
in the constitutional design generates a corollary of free movement within the nation's borders. The Court's close watch over
legislative apportionment and distribution of the franchise by
states also may rest, at least in part, upon structural assumptions
concerning the democratic process and fair opportunity to participate in that process. 239 A lamentable consequence of the recent
prominence of substantive equal protection is that these interests, whose creation may be defensible on structural theories,
have been anchored in the equal protection clause, 240 from which
233. I spare the reader (and myself) the usual string citation. For those obsessed with
cumulative documentation, however, see the sources cited in G. GUNTHER, supra note 11,
at 525 n.t.
234. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 11-2.
235. There have been some serious recent objections to this unity. See, e.g., Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J., and Burger,
C.J.); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by
Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J.); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 369 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring). (Powell's concurrence treats several cases and so precedes the Apodaca
majority opinion.).
236. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
237. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14.
238. See the detailed discussion in text at notes 371-86 infra.
239. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
240. See cases cited in notes 76-78 supra. It may be that no fourteenth amendment
strand is necessary to support application of structurally derived concerns to the states,
and that the supremacy clause alone provides the necessary authority. That seems somewhat persuasive in the context of the travel right, given its pre-1868 antecedent in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), although Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969), apparently perceived the relevance of the due
process clause to that travel problem. And the cases involving reapportionment and voting
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a necessary set of limiting principles does not readily spring.
b. Moving outside the document - fundamental value
discovery. The third and most controversial source of preferred
liberties has been a "non-source": naked judicial judgment that
a liberty is of special constitutional magnitude, despite a lack of
persuasive linkage with structural or textually identified values.
Virtually all of the decisional law meeting this description protects family relationships, actual or potential. Resort to the socalled constitutional rights of "privacy" begs the question of the
source of those rights, since, despite the contrary assertion in
Griswold, the constitutional text creates no such general right. 241
Furthermore, even if such a right did exist, family autonomy
concerns would fit uneasily within it, and the decisions of the past
fifteen years suggest that not even judges believe that a "privacy
as autonomy" right exists in any generalizable form. 242 Privacy as
a label is both infinitely useful and ultimately useless; it can take
you everywhere, and consequently, cannot reliably get you· anywhere.243 If the "naked" substantive due process decisions had to
rights seem impossible to defend without some fairly direct linkage with the fourteenth
amendment. But despite the strong equality themes in these cases, I think they too rest
so uneasily on the equal protection clause that other avenues should be pursued. See text
at notes 371-86 infra.
241. See Ely, supra note 88, at 929 (right of privacy inferable only "so long as some
care is taken in defining the sort of right the inference will support.") (emphasis original).
Professor Ely reads Griswold as a case protecting the home against the "most outrageous
sort of governmental prying" which enforcement of the ban on contraceptive use would
require. Id. at 930. See also Dixon, supra note 11, at 83-85 (Griswold and Roe are cases
about "freedom of action," not about privacy). Some commentators have argued that the
privacy right is really a set of rights relating to autonomy and seclusion. See generally
Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Li{estyle, 62 CoRN ELL L. REV.
563 (1977); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 670 (1973). Autonomy as a claim moves far beyond any existing conception of'
constitutional privacy. Autonomy is a claim made by every substantive due process plaintiff, seeking to be "let alone," whether from wage and hour regulation or a contraceptive
ban. See also Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
CoLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV, 233
(1977).
242. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), proffered a general discussion of the privacy
right, but held that a statute under which information was stored about legitimate users
of dangerous prescription drugs is subject to no more than a rationality test, albeit a fairly
careful one. And both Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (upholding a hair grooming
regulation for police officers), and Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976),
affg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding a statute proscribing homosexual
relations between consenting adults), suggest that the Court is rather unreceptive to a
general "autonomy" component of the privacy concept. For reasons that will appear in
Section IV.A.2. below, I think such general unreceptivity is warranted.
243. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 15-1.
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be summed up in a brief capsule, rights of "familial choice" 244
would be a far more accurate description than rights of "privacy."
But rights of "familial choice" stand starkly naked, since no
amount of Bill of Rights penumbra-fashioning can responsibly
lead to "family rights" as a protected category. 245 What, then, is
244. Cf. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 11 & n.40 (suggesting that the Court had
lumped together the distinct activities of sex, marriage, childbearing, and childrearing to
form a constitutional unit.)
245. An intriguing straw man to pursue is the possibility that the free exercise clause
might house the "familial choice" liberties that are currently preferred. The clause cannot
be totally irrelevant to the inner-directed and (at least occasionally) spiritually influenced
choices at stake in family matters. If marriage and family choices could fairly be viewed
as exercises of a consensus American religion, rather than merely shifting social arrangements akin to "shifting economic arrangements," Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), a textually based doctrine protecting those choices might
be defended, confined, and legitimized. Such a doctrine might, for administrative ease
and out of concern to avoid intrusion in matters of conscience, conclusively presume that
family and parental choices are constitutionally equivalent to religious choices. Both
involve dimensions of the human spirit that include, but go beyond, rational judgment.
Both are a function of man's deepest needs to overcome isolation and the loneliness of
atomized existence, and to reach out for connections with forces that define and give
meaning to life. Both require commitment, dedication, and acceptance of obligation beyond narrow sensclry satisfaction. Fastening substantive due process activism to the free
exercise clause would exonerate the Court from charges of looking to natural law, or
personal prejudices, in marking special areas of liberty, and would refocus the debate on
the contemporary meaning of religion in an increasingly secularized state.
Such a theory, though remotely plausible, cannot escape serious, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties. First, the claims are rarely made that way, and there are limits
beyond which even the most creative rerationalization cannot responsibly proceed. Second, there are good reasons why family autonomy claims are rarely pressed as religion
claims; the rights being sought, in the minds and hearts of the seekers, presumably bear
little or no resemblance to concerns commonly understood as "religious." For the Court
to seize upon this theory might well invite some very strange claims of "religious freedom."
(How seriously would we have been willing to take Margaret Lovisi's claim, if she had
made one, that she had been divinely inspired to invite a fellow to join her husband and
herself in a menage a trois?) See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). We would
take it seriously as part of an insanity defense, but not as a free exercise defense. Lawyers
are skeptical, and sometimes it is healthy. Freud might take a different view of the linkage
between sex and religion. Religion (at least monotheistic forms of it), you see, involves
subservience to an ultimate father figure, suggesting that, at least for males, acts of
heterosexual intercourse are religious in the sense of taking the Oedipal risk - coupling
with mother at the peril of patriarchal retribution. All very interesting, but all quite
repressed and unconscious, thank goodness. Constitutional law would do well to limit its
concern to the conscious mind.)
Finally, the most telling objection to a free exercise rationalization of substantive due
process activism is that it seems too reminiscent of the vice of the Griswold penumbras.
It redefines a specific constitutional protection at a level of generality that permits the
addition of a large bloc of content that is excessively remote from the core concept of
religion. An expansion of the free exercise clause to include familial choices on grounds
of the sort suggested at the outset of this footnote could not, I fear, produce principled
distinctions between family choices, on one hand, and achievement of sexual satisfaction
in diverse ways, drug consumption choices (but see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394
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the magic formula for determining who resides in this wing of the
preferred-liberty mansion? As a matter of constitutional theory,
it can hardly be sufficient that a majority of the nine landlords
desire to let the room.
A responsible defense of judicial discovery of unenumerated
fundamental values must respond to the persistent and articulate
attacks upon that practice. 246 Simply put, the standard criticism
runs something like this: Judicial invalidation of the outcome of
ordinary political processes is undemocratic, and hence presumptively counter to the explicit premises around which we have
organized our relationship to government. 247 Textual warrant for
the invalidation partly overcomes this "usurpation" argument,
because the constitutional text itself emanated from an extraordinary act of popular sovereignty. 248 Thus, courts relying on clear
and specific commands in the text to strike down a legislative act
are acting as agents of the people; judicial review imposes a reflective, extraordinary majoritarian judgment against identifiable excesses of a momentary majority. 249 However, the critics
assert, courts are no longer justified in calling upon the protective
mantle of the Constitution to validate their actions if 1) the text
provides no warrant for intervention or 2) the warrant lacks demonstrable standards to guide its use. 250
Those are the criticisms; whatever their merit or applicability in other areas, aggressive fourteenth amendment intervention
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Native American Church members are constitutionally
protected in their use of peyote in bona fide religious practices)), and other so-called
"autonomy" interests. Dumping all these choices in the free exercise wagon would soon
break it down, a collapse that might imperil the modern trend to expand the definition
of religion for free exercise purposes beyond narrowly theistic conceptions. See L. T!ueE,
supra note 1, § 14-6.
246. The most recent and most important is Ely, Foreword, supra note 9. Professor
Ely, it should be pointed out, believes that certain clauses do have a nontextual content,
but that the due process clauses are not among them. Id. at 5 n.3. His Foreword, in any
event, is a general rejection of all nontextual value sources other than those implicit in
the theories of judicial intervention suggested by the Carolene Products footnote. See also
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). The classic attack on judicial review pursuant to the "sweeping terms" of the fourteenth amendment is that of Learned Hand in
his book, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
247. See, e.g.,' A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962); Ely,
Constitutional lnterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 !ND. L.J. 399, 404-12 (1978).
248. Ely; supra note 247, at 412 (citing, inter alia, Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1975)).
249. See Grey, supra note 248. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 247, at 16-23.
250. The most outspoken proponent of this view, aimed particularly at substantive
due process, was Justice Black. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510-24
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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does not necessarily fall before either. The argument that the text
does not warrant this sort of intervention is more easily asserted
than defended. If repetition is not worthless (and the law rarely
makes it so), the fourteenth amendment's longstanding service as
a textual warrant must be somewhat probative. 251 Even if the due
process clauses do not properly encompass substantive claims,
both the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment suggest that the constitutional framers recognized the need for relatively open-ended provisions, 252 and were not content to limit the protection of rights
to the enumeration in amendments one through eight. Furthermore, any insistence that the fourteenth amendment imposes no
substantive values upon the states leads to an unraveling of significant portions of the fabric of modern constitutional law, including the application of the first and the eighth amendments
to the states.253 The less extreme idea that the Court can properly
shop inside, but not outside, the Bill of Rights for values to impose upon the states by way of the fourteenth amendment has
never been intellectually defensible on textual grounds alone. 254
And even if a critic can resist the allure of partial incorporation
- that is, even if he can swallow the implications of a fourteenth
amendment defanged except for certain matters of race discrimination255 - it seems far too late for either the Court or society to
pay much attention. Judicial expansion of the fourteenth amendment - including its substantive, libertarian dimensions - has
proceeded for so long, and has generated such an elaborate matrix
of rights, duties, values, and expectations, that sudden withdrawal from the practice would undermine established patterns
of constitutional protection presently perceived as essential in a
free society. 256
The other component of the argument against fundamental
value adjudication - that the process is purely and inescapably
251. But see R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 352 ("Usurpation - the exercise of power
not granted - is not legitimated by repetition.")
252. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5 n.3; Ely, supra note 247, at 424-36, 44045.
253. See Monaghan, supra note 98, at 129-30.
254. If the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the entire Bill of Rights but
does authorize a search for values outside the amendment itself, the only objection to
going outside the Bill must be that th~ search lacks objective reference points, not that
the text fails to authorize it.
255. Raoul Berger is apparently willing to swallow them. See R. BERGER, supra note
246.
256. See Monaghan, supra note 98, at 129-30.
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subjective - presents a more formidable challenge. 257 In his recent Foreword, Professor Ely has unleashed a broadside attack on
the fundamental value theorists, and for precisely these reasons. 258 He argues that once the Court moves beyond the Carolene
Products footnote conception of fostering values protective of
powerless minorities, 259 no source of adequate standards exists for
the discovery of fundamental values. Concerning many of the
commonly invoked criteria for discovery offundamental values the judge's personal values, 260 natural law, 281 neutral principles, 262
"reason, " 263 and the idea of progress264 - I agree on all significant
points with Professor Ely's conclusions that the subjectivity problem remains unresolved. With respect to those two sources of
value that Professor Ely has more difficulty attacking - tradition
and the social consensus - I am in significant, though not complete, disagreement, for reasons that will become apparent very
shortly.
I am, of course, far from alone in attempting to find nonsubjective sources to invoke responsibly in fundamental-values
adjudication. Several commentators who endorse such adjudication have made similar attempts, but their formulations somehow fall short of the mark, often for the same reason: a felt need
to defend the indefensible result in Roe v. Wade. For example,
Professor Perry, one of the most diligent and determined advocates of substantive due process adjudication, has argued that it
has textual warrant and is justifiable as the performance of what
Perry terms an "ethical function." 265 The textual warrant is the
due process clause itself, 266 which was intended, according to
Perry, to evolve over time287 and to require that legislation be
related to the "public welfare." 288 In order to determine what
257. Here, of course, those who stake their lot with partial incorporation and no more
are on safer ground, because incorporation doctrine at least has the virtue of imposing
values that the framers intended to impose on some level of government.
258. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 16-55.
259. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. See note 44 supra.
260. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 19-22.
261. Id. at 22-32.
262. Id. at 32-33.
263. Id. at 33-39.
264. Id. at 52-54. .
265. See Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11. Professor Perry has further elaborated his views in Substantive Due Process Kevisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, supra note 11.
266. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 699-706.
267. Id. at 699, 713-19.
268. Id. at 693-94.
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constitutes the "public welfare" - and in particular the "public
morals" portion of the "public welfare" 269 - the court must evaluate the "conventional moral culture." 270 This evaluation, contends Perry, is what involves the Court in the ethical function of
substantive due process adjudication, because a probe of the conventional moral culture propels the Court into deciding whether
particular private moral decisions are, in light of the evolving
norms of society, properly regulatable by the legal manifestations
of public morality. 271 Thus, in Perry's view, the sources for ascertaining what is within and without the "public welfare" include
informed public opinion and each Justice's own conscientious
assessment of that opinion, the state of the moral culture, and the
relationship of the claim to that culture.272
The major difficulty with the Perry view273 is the tension built
into it, and the unacceptably high risk of "error" which that
tension creates. This tension operates between Perry's dynamic,
open-ended Constitution, capable of growth to meet the needs of
succeeding generations, and the rapidity -of social change that
stimulates the cry for constitutional dynamism. That rapidity
renders exceedingly difficult any meaningful conclusions about
the "conventional moral culture." Views on abortion and homosexuality, for example, have shifted dramatically in the past decade, and continue to evolve. But the change has not proceeded
uniformly, and judges can never confidently predict what the
"conventional moral culture" will hold with respect to these issues ten years from today. Moreover, in a nation spanning close
to five million square miles and including over two hundred million people, the "conventional moral culture" is likely to vary
significantly from place to place274 and to vary as well among
different groups within the same community. The Perry view
thus puts the Court at terrible risk that it will misperceive the
near future, no matter how "objective" its calculations may be
269. Id. at 723-33.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 719-33.
272. Id. at 729-31. The essence of the argument, however, turns out to be more
"inner" than "outer" directed: "Ultimately, however, each individual Justice must map
the relevant contours of conventional moral culture alone. Each Justice must ask whether
particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or her." Id. at 730.
273. The view is not his alone. See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 91, at 284. See also
sources cited in Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 43 nn.166-67.
274. Although Professor Perry does not provide clear signals on this point, he seems
to conclude that national (not state or local) moral culture is what counts. Perry, Ethical
Function, supra note 11, at 732 n.201.
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at the moment of decision. For reasons I will explain in a moment,
Perry is correct that support in conventional morality is a
necessary condition for substantive due process activism on behalf of unenumerated rights, but he goes astray in concluding
that it is also a sufficient condition.
In a recent essay, 275 Professor Tushnet has espoused a view
that is, on the matter of standards, yet a step closer to my own.
He argues that two criteria should govern the establishment of
substantive due process rights: (1) "general agreement on the
social importance of that right, " 276 and (2) "the settled weight of
responsible opinion" .277 Tushnet's first criterion turns out to be
not too distant from Perry's, although Tushnet adds the Marshallian suggestion that "the relationship between the right and
other constitutionally guaranteed rights" 278 is a relevant, although apparently not controlling, consideration. Tushnet's second criterion, however, adds a useful dimension, because it offers
some insurance against the unreasonable risks associated with
Perry's analysis. 279 Although Tushnet's attempt strikes me as
moving in the right direction, it lacks adequate development and
justification. Tushnet seems to argue that "almost any publicly
disclosed standard will do" 280 for substantive due process, so long
as it does not unnecessarily sti.fle the opportunity for state experimentation with new policies. Given the painful history of substantive due process adjudication, Tushnet's relaxed attitude
about acceptable standards seems wholly unacceptable ..
Tushnet's proposal is plagued further by the uncertainty of
its implications for substantive constitutional adjudication. His
primary target is the erratic evolution of the notion of "property"
for purposes of triggering the procedural safeguards of the fourteenth amendment. 281 Though his theory seems broader in scope,
he purports to be doing no more than providing a substitute for
the Board of Regents u. Roth282 theory that the locus of property
interests consists of expectations crystallized by the operation of
275. Tushnet, supra note 11.
276. Id. at 279.
277. Id.
278. Id. The Marshall reference is of course to the present Associate Justice and his
Rodriguez dissent, and not to the 19th century Chief Justice. See note 98 supra,
279. It does not, however, offer enough assurance, unless "settled" has roots reasonably deep in time. See text at notes 304-14 infra. Moreover, the reference to "responsible
opinion" is discomfortingly elitist. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 51.
280. Tushnet, supra note 11, at 279.
281. Id. at 261-77.
282. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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state law. 283 Tushnet may have chosen a useful weapon, but unless he defends it more carefully, his choice seems exceedingly
disproportionate to his target. 284
In my view, a single insight paves the way to an approach to
unenumerated rights adjudication that maximizes its legitimacy
and minimizes the risks of subjectivity and unauthorized countermajoritarianism: the Constitution, whether or not its judicially
enforceable provisions are (or were meant to be) open-ended and
dynamic, is itself always open-ended. The framers ·saw to that in
article V, which, as good schoolchildren know, explains how the
document can be amended. Indeed, one of the most smugly asserted and rarely answered charges leveled periodically at fourteen th amendment activism is that it involves the Court in
amending the Constitution. 285 This, of course, is one of the ways
in which judicial work-product is dismissed as illegitimate and
usurping, because those sanie· good schoolchildren will tell you
that article V requires Congress or a state-inspired constitutional
convention to propose amendments and st"ate legislatures to ratify them. Justices of the United States Supreme Court are conspicuously omitted from any formal role in the process.
The schoolchildren have certainly learned their lessons well,
but here Professor Perry and I share a common rejoinder: An
extraordinary national majority may oppose a law over many
decades, but for reasons that dramatize the difference between a
republic and a democracy, its members may fail to enshrine their
opposition in the form of a statute or constitutional amendment.288 On such occasions, the Court has a legitimate gap-filling
283. See generally Monaghan, supra note 218, at 434-43; Van Alstyne, supra note 229.
284. As discussed earlier, see text at notes 222-27 supra, analysis of both property and
liberty have significantly different starting and ending places, depending on whether the
constitutional claim is procedural or substantive. Professor Tushnet appears to miss this
point, with the consequence that his arguments for more complete procedural protection
for government-created benefits get unnecessarily bound up with, and bogged down by,
his case for something he calls "substantive due process." Given his concern for the
process of adjudicating claims, rather than the adequacy of the substantive ground advanced by the government to justify the deprivation, his label is what seems to be misplaced.
285. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 1-3.
286. See Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 727-28. The failure to translate
attitude into legal protection may stem from simple incognizance: many citizens might
reasonably fail to perceive that what was once a minority position has quietly become
quite popular indeed. More likely, inaction of this sort may be accounted for by a theory
of political change that distinguishes between favorable attitude and self-interest. Successful agitation (and its requisite money, organization, and political representation) for
change is not likely to occur until mere sentiment for a change becomes a concrete
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role to play. _Pieces of the nation's bedrock may lie chipped and
broken in the gap, and the Court can mend them by performing
a function akin to that performed in other contexts by the amending process - it can test the depth, over time, of the community's
commitment to the inviolability and unique importance of certain values. 287 This notion is hardly novel, although some of its
theoretical trappings may be. It echoes ceaselessly across this
century's constitutional law, from Holmes 288 to Cardozo28 u to
Frankfurter290 to Harlan. 291 The words may change, but the search
remains the same. It is for values deeply embedded in the society,
values treasured by both past and present, values behind which
the society and its legal system have unmistakably thrown their
weight. Contemporary consensus, even if discoverable, is not
enough, due to the risks canvassed above. 292 To protect against
those risks and be confident that the value being insulated from
government power is truly an "embedded" one, the Court must
decide that the claim satisfies two related tests:
1) Historically, American institutions must have recognized the
liberty claim as one of paramount stature.
"interest." Cf. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScOIT CASE 28 (1978):
From time to time at the Constitutional Convention there had been confrontations
between a slavery interest and an antislavery sentiment. The interest was concentrated, persistent, practical, and testily defensive. The sentiment tended to be
diffuse, sporadic, moralistic and tentative . . . .
In the day-to-day operations of government . . • interest would usually have
the advantage over sentiment.
Political scientists have made similar observations about modern pluralism and the process of political change. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (Yale Studies in Political Science
No. 4, 1961). And especially for some of the emotion-charged, value-tied claims that are
presented to the Supreme Court under the substantive due process rubric, the intensity
of self-interest may well be missing despite a highly favorable, long-standing national
sentiment in favor of change. Sparse enforcement - such that most citizens feel safe from
the law's prohibitions and penalties - often operates to undercut any development of the
requisite interest. A program of vigorous investigation and prosecution of the crime of
fornication between consenting unmarried adults would be a powerful incentive to eradication of the prohibition. See generally Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the
Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 251 (1978).
287. The time dimension suggested here distinguishes the proposed approach from
the "continuing constitutional convention" image invoked and criticized by Berger. See
R. BERGER, supra note 246, at 2-3 & n.5.
288. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) ("fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law") (Holmes, J., dissenting).
289. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934) ("principles of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
290. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-30 (1949).
291. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
292. See text at notes 273-74 supra.
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2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a
level of high priority.

If a liberty claim satisfies both prongs of the inquiry, the
Court should preclude any state interference with that liberty,
absent extraordinary justification for permitting it. An approach
of this sort does not endeavor to define the elusive "public welfare" as does Perry's theory; nor does it attempt to project an
unlimitable spectrum of human choices for protection as I think
Professor Tribe's theories do. 293 Rather, it is a deeply conservative
and restrained theory of value discovery; it would not permit the
Court to lead society's "progressive" forces against their more
"reactionary" foes. Although it authorizes the Justices to do a
small portion of the general citizenry's article V work, it recognizes the extraordinary countermajoritarian qualities of that
authority, and it accordingly counsels the Justices to do so only
when a state invades the holy core of the American sanctuary of
liberties.
·
Professor Ely's Foreword attacks any such approach to the
value source problem on two grounds: 1) nonascertainability and
2) general irrelevance to the task of individual rights adjudication. The latter point requires immediate response; if Ely is right
on this score, no one need bother with a reply to the former. Ely's
central thesis is that individual rights adjudication under the
constitution exists primarily to ensure an open political process
and to protect powerless minorities against abuses of that process. 294 He concludes from that thesis that "it simply makes no
sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the ma293. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 889 ("preservation of 'those attributes of an
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood' "). Professor Tribe, in a later section on
"Sources of Protected Rights of Personhood," id. at 893-96, suggests a range of possible
sources, carefully avoids coming to rest on any particular one, and ultimately seems to
opt for an amalgam of approaches to the problem of judicial- discovery of the human
essence. He does, however, posit a vision of the protection of enduring values. ("Nothing
less [than wise reflection] will yield a language and structure for creating a future continuous with and contiguous to the most humane designs of the past." Id. at 982-93.) Professors Wilkinson and White, in their article on Constitutional Protection for Personal
Lifestyles, supra note 241, at 611-14, do not offer a governing standard at all. Rather, they
suggest several reasons why "lifestyles" should be a judicial concern, including protection
of "human dignity," protection of "powerless minorities," respect for pluralistic values,
and partial coincidence with first amendment values. I am sympathetic to all of these
ideas, yet I remain unconvinced that they offer a meaningful avenue of relief from either
the countermajoritarian difficulty or the problem of subjectivity.
294. See Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5-15; see generally Ely, 37 Mn. L. REv. 451,
supra note 9.
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jority. ''295 He makes clear, moreover, his view that the value judgments of "past majorities" ("tradition") are no more useful in
this regard298 than those of present majorities ("consensus"), a
secondary premise that seems to follow quite perfectly from the
initial one.
But just as Ely admits to being F .A. Hayek's "demagogue,"297 I am Ely's believer in nonsense. Ely is so intent on
protecting minorities that he has forgotten the nature of the
protective agency. For what is the Constitution itself, if not a
collection of "[enduring] value judgments of the majority," interpreted and applied by courts so as to be "the vehicle for protecting minorities from the [monetary] value judgments of
the majority"? 298 The entire body of the Constitution, amendments and all, is a series of judgments by an extraordinary majority that limit the power of future political majorities. 299 Requirements of political consensus are thus built in by the ratification
requirements. Moreover, tradition played a vital role in the very
creation of the Constitution. 300 The "value judgments of the majority" are not only a sensible source of protection of minorities;
those judgments turn out, in the end, to be the only source of
protection for minorities against the hostile passions of an occasional, transient majority.
Secondly, Ely's rejection of the "value judgments of the majority" as a source of rights fails to distinguish among national,
statewide, and local majorities. The ratification of the fourteenth
amendment itself stands as an act by the national majority to
295. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 52 (emphasis original).
296. Id. at 42-43.
297. The reference is to Hayek's assertion that "[o]nly a demagogue can represent
as 'antidemocratic' the limitations which long term decisions and the general principles
held by the people impose upon the power of temporary majorities." Id. at 44 (citing F.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 181 (1960)).
298. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 52.
299. Professor Ely acknowledges this problem, Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 4243, but attempts to avoid it by reference to the open-endedness of the provisions under
discussion. "Hone wanted to freeze a tradition," he says, "the sensible course would be
to write it down." True, if one knew in advance which traditions might conceiuably come
under siege. Various battles over the rights of Englishmen gave the framers some clues hence, a Bill of Rights in reasonably specific terms. But if one had the sense that, out of
a range of important traditions, some would wither and others endure, and that the
enduring ones would come under occasional attack by momentary (and usually local)
majorities, one might well write an open-ended provision and expect the judges interpreting it to take account of surviving traditions in doing so.
300. The Bill of Rights surely was prompted in part by a developing tradition of
liberty against government, a tradition sparked by the impositions of the English Crown
upon the colonists. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
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limit the power of a state or municipal majority. If one reads Ely's
italics with that idea in mind, his sentence runs "it simply makes
no sense to employ the value judgments of [national] majorities
as the vehicle for protecting [local] minorities from the value
judgments of the [local] majority." If that is what Professor Ely
means, then he thinks that judicial review under any substantive
provision addressed to the states makes no sense. But we know
he doesn't think that at all. 301 Having focused so long on the
Carolene Products footnote, Professor Ely's vision has gone off by
a few diopters. While he correctly observes that the Constitution
itself "concretizes" relatively few "value judgments"302 and persuasively theorizes that those portions of the document most
often invoked in individual rights adjudication were designed to
protect minorities and minority viewpoints, he has forgotten that
such is not the document's total design, its exclusive result, or,
most importantly, its originating force.
Viewed with an eye toward the structure of the Constitution
and the role its official interpreters have continuously envisioned
for judges, tradition and community values cannot be irrelevant.
We must therefore confront Professor Ely's other objection that the values deserving of protection are not objectively ascertainable. Of course, when the values are expressed in an
amendment, their underpinnings are usually well-understood,
and the Court must do its best, in any event, to find them. Moreover, whenever the amendment process produces something, it
has resolved conflicts and contradictions among traditional and
contemporary values, and has done so by a politically complete
expression of the popular will. By contrast, substantive due process adjudication cannot be said to share those qualities of channeled discoverability, value resolution, or national ratification.
Its sources of value and legitimacy are elsewhere, and the
"elsewhere" that I propose must measure up against Professor
Ely's powerful criticisms. 303
(i) Historical recognition. The Moore plurality embraced this element of the test, 304 and it may be the more impor301. Indeed, Professor Ely is outspoken and eloquent in defense of an active judicial
role of the sort suggested in the Carotene Products footnote. See, e.g., sources cited in note
294 supra.
302. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 42 n.160.
303. Even Professor Ely concedes that nonascertainability can never be a completely
dispositive objection on issues where close judgments must inevitably be made. Id. at 42
(tradition), 49 (consensus).
304. 431 U.S. at 503-06, (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.). Justice Powell's emphasis
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tant of the two for circumscribing the growth of substantive due
process. Far more effectively than a nebulous doctrine of privacy
or autonomy that expands to include new rights every time a
judge hears a claim that "resonates" within him, 305 a doctrine
controlled by history resists rapid growth. There may, of course,
be many ways in which history demonstrates recognition of a
liberty as fundamental: a lengthy record of common or statutory
law protecting the interest, 306 a conscious and purposeful tradition
of nonregulation, 307 or strong currents of respect for the liberty by
the "progenitors and architects of American institutions. " 308 Each
of these sources appears to be a tempting starting place for the
search for historically embedded values. Professor Ely, however,
asserts that the problems here are "obvious." The problems he
mentions309 include those of cultural geography (whose tradition?), time (which era's tradition?), competing traditions (which
one counts?), and level of generality (how big is a tradition?). The
general invocation of "tradition" as a source of values does suggest all of these problems. A difference exists, however, between
a test that entails only a vague and general scrutiny of "traditions," such as Ely discusses, and one that demands a continuous
on history has found expression in the opinions of other Justices as well, See 431 U.S. at
507-10 (Brennan, J., concurring); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978); Carey
v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); 431 U.S. at 708-09 (Powell, J,, concurring); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251-53 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roe v,
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-41, 158 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-95
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J,,
dissenting); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534 (1925); Meyer v, Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J ., dissenting),
305. Cf. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 265, at 730 ("each individual Justice
must map the relevant contours of the conventional moral culture alone" and "ask
whether particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or her."),
306. See, e.g:, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977) (lengthy history of
common law protection of liberty against excessive paddling).
307. Concededly, evidence of this sort may not be so easy to discover. Nonregulation
is presumably the product of indifference as often as it is the product of respect for the
liberty at stake. At times, however, exemption from regulation may result from deeply
held principles; for example, such a pattern might arise if some interested organization
undertook to introduce, in several state legislatures, a series of bills aimed at forbidding
parents from serving alcoholic beverages to their own minor children. Persistent rejection
of them on grounds of family autonomy, especially if the rejections continued over time,
would be useful evidence of historical recognition.
308. The phrase belongs to Sanford Kadish. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in
Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319,328 (1957), Professor Kadish limited his survey to problems of procedural fairness in criminal cases; concededly, the opinions of the "architects" on such matters may be easier to discover than their
opinions on the substantive liberty questions with which I am concerned.
309. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 39-40.
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and continuing historical momentum in favor of a liberty interest
over any competing claims in society. I advocate the latter approach, and with my position so framed, I will respond to Ely's
charges.
Geography is easy - only our traditions are relevant. Evidence of heightened respect for some threatened freedom in other
nations, English-speaking or not, is simply makeweight. Without
continuous support in American legal and social traditions, any
claim that a value is fundamental in the American constitutional
scheme lacks merit. We can learn from others' good ideas and
cherished freedoms, but we are surely not bound by them.
The question of time is only slightly more troublesome. The
essence of the test of historical recognition is long-standing respect for the liberty, up to and including the time of decision
(when it becomes the test of contemporary values). Long-abandoned traditions are inadequate, even if recently resurrected.
Exactly how far back the historical record must go to satisfy
this part of the test is difficult to pin down. The length of
historical support required to support the claim might vary with
the intensity with which it is held, but, in any event, no less than
a generation of special respect ought to suffice. A shorter period
would run the risk associated with Professor Perry's view, and any
requirement much longer than a generation would generate insufficient power to protect values that have truly achieved stable
and continuous support. The suggestion in Rodriguez that states
might have a constitutional duty to provide a minimum of public
education 310 - given the long-standing and deeply significant
expectation that it will be provided - is consistent with the
theory suggested here. Additional illustrations might ultimately
emerge from the evolution of family law. A statute limiting
grounds for divorce to adultery might run afoul of the "deeply
embedded values" standard, 311 since most states have recognized
the right to dissolve marriage on no-fault grounds, and that expectation has at least begun to sink deep roots into our social soil.
Some cases will, of course, raise difficult issues of historical
interpretation and value discovery. Hopefully, judges can assess,
the historical strength of a claimed liberty with sufficient subtlety
310. 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
311. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (violation of due process for state
to deny disolution of marriage because of inability to pay where state monopolizes means
of dissolution). See generally Monograph No. 6, 4 FAM. L. REP. 4033 (1978) (as of Aug. 1,
1978, only three states retain "fault only" grounds for divorce).
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to take into account the texture of historical processes, such as
major events in the life of a nation, or temporary periods of setbacks for a particular value, sandwiched between lengthy periods
of respect for it.
The problems of competing traditions and levels of generality
raised by Professor Ely can be analyzed from a similar perspective. Within the paradigm I have espoused, the ju'dge is free neither to select one personally favorite tradition out of many, nor
to redefine the history of liberty in a way that produces a desired
result. At times the common law may provide a useful reference
point in resolving competing claims of tradition and in defining
the level of specificity at which a claim has adequate historical
support. 312 Some claims, however, will not present precise common law analogues. A legislative prohibition, for example, of the
use of "cloning" techniques for human reproduction would, if
attacked on substantive due process grounds, raise the sort of
problems with which Professor Ely is concerned. Is the claim
supported by a "deeply embedded value" of autonomy in reproductive decisions? Or (and this would be my view), is that formulation of the value both too general, and too hostile to competing
sensitivities, to cope adequately with a wholly new reproductive
capability, which might well be stimulating a general social
abhorrence? In light of the essentially conservative premises underlying the "embedded values" notion, care must be taken to
define "preferred liberty" at a level general enough to capture all
of its historical essence, yet specific enough to resist open-ended
growth that is likely to outdistance the social commitment upon
which the liberty rests.
Thus, as I have proposed it, the historical test rejects both a
fully "closed" and a fully "dynamic" view of the substantive
content of the fourteenth amendment. If applied as intended, it
prevents the Court from latching on prematurely to social trends
and thereby too hastily freezing the power of the political processes to respond to them. This, I fear, is an accurate description
of Roe v. Wade, where the Court, in an effort to justify its conclusions by historical analysis, overlooked the powerful trend of the
past one hundred years to proscribe most abortions. 313
312. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See note 222 supra.
313. See generally Destro, supra note 90, at 1273-82. Destro argues further that Roe's
analysis of early English common law, construing it to recognize abortion as common law
right (410 U.S. at 135-36) is flawed. Id. at 1267-73.
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The historical test also explains, in light of persistent
prohibitions on consensual adult homosexuality, the affirmance
(though not necessarily the failure to justify it) in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.314 If, on the other hand, the great bulk of
states decriminalize homosexuality, the Court might be justified
some years later in overruling that case and adding a new component to preferred liberty. It is the deep and continuous social
embrace with a value, and not its importance to the individual,
that brings it special stature.
(ii) Contemporary values. Incorporation of contemporary values into a fundamental liberty test presents some difficulties. On the one hand, consensus is a necessary component of any
theory of constitutional adjudication in support of unenumerated
values. 315 Without more pointed textual warrant to support judicial intervention, some element of popular sovereignty appears
essential to the legitimacy of the process. 316 In contrast, however,
to the ordinary research and analysis designed to discover respect
for a particular liberty by legal institutions, social consensus is
difficult to measure, especially on a nationwide basis. Moreover,
I do not differ here with Professor Ely's observation that the
opinions of lawyers, judges, and "experts" alone are insufficient.317 If the Court is "amending," substantial support in the
hearts and minds of the entire populace, not only of a professional
elite, is a prerequisite. The Court's handling of that inquiry in
this decade's capital punishment cases318 suggests the hazards of
evaluating contemporary values in this fashion. Finally, the very
314. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); affg. mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge
court).
315. The Justices have on occasion embraced this approach, but not without greater
trepidation than in the case of inquiry into traditional values. If "weight of authority"
counts for anything here, I am afraid my side of the scale comes up a bit light. For dicta
apparently approving a consensus standard, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 519 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); 410 U.S. at 174 (1973); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) ("Constitutional questions
1
••• are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion . . . .").
316. See note 273 supra.
317. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 37-39.
318. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
408 U.S. at 332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring). Ironically, it is with respect to the eighth
amendment that "community standards" had seemed most acceptable. See Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
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law under attack is always at least some evidence that contemporary social values do not overwhelmingly predominate in favor of
the proposed liberty interest. 319 In a nation as demographically
diverse as this one, the favorite freedom of northern California
may be shocking sin to those in the Bible Belt.
These obstacles do not necessarily render contemporary social values irrelevant to substantive adjudication ·under the due
process clause. They do, however, counsel great caution and restraint in applying this portion of the test. A court should not
sweep under the closest rug obvious and deep divisions of opinion
on the value in question; when significant numbers stand deeply
opposed on moral grounds to a particular practice, the contemporary respect for those who engage in it can hardly be called
"deeply embedded. " 320
Acceptable sources of data on contemporary value consensus
are, concededly, difficult to pinpoint. Federal legislation - if
recent and closely on point - helps, since it reflects the views of
a national majority321 (though, admittedly, not necessarily an extraordinary one). But here too, caution is required, since Congress
can readily repeal the legislation if values suddenly shift, while
the Court will not likely overrule its own pronouncement of a
"fundamental value." A widespread pattern of state legislation in
support of the liberty is also relevant; although many legislators
may be lawyers, they can still roughly reflect the perceived popular will. The work of social science may also buttress - but not
replace - other indicators that a particular value possesses widespread and powerful social support.
·
At the extreme, isolating contemporary moral values is not
overly difficult. Can a reasonable mind dou.bt that a general consensus exists concerning government interference with the choice
of contraception by a married couple? Or, to propose a doomed
case, that freedom to smoke marijuana has not even reached the
threshold level of widespread social respect, much less the level
of "deeply embedded values"? For the hard cases, the available
data may admit of no simple conclusion. Lack of easy answers,
319. -Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 11, at 724. But cf. id. at 727 (some laws have
been "on the books for so long that [they] no longer reflect contemporary moral culture,"
citing the Connecticut prohibition on contraceptive use as an example).
320. For example, Roe v. Wade cannot possibly be justified on the basis of a deeply
embedded contemporary or historical value.
321. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1183-93
(1977), for a refined discussion of reliance upon congressional action as a source of constitutional norms.
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however, provides no excuse for failure to search for guideposts,
in both legal and extralegal sources. Of course, the test does not
require a demonstration of social unanimity; not even the official
amendment process imposes such an insuperable obstacle. But
serious and legitimate doubt about social values should counsel
rejection of the claim or, at the least, imposition of a requirement
that the historical hurdle of this steeplechase be cleared with
extraordinary room to spare.
Finally, the question of judicial competence to discover contemporary values deserves a word. Professor Ely argues that legislative competence to translate existing social, moral, and political values into law substantially exceeds judicial capability to
perform a similar task. 322 Once again, his failure to distinguish
national from state government is crucial. If the search for fundamental values embodied in the fourteenth amendment is one for
national values, can a single state legislature really uncover them
as well as a supreme national court? Presumably, the national
legislature is in the best position to make the required assessment, but, as a general matter, it frequently refuses to accept th~
assignment. 323 Modern theories of judicial notice - that courts
are free to notice "legislative facts" when it is convenient, so long
as the parties are notified and given opportunities to rebut324 provide further support for the claim of competence offered here.
Ongoing public or scholarly doubts concerning competence suggest, moreover, the critical importance of full judicial disclosure
of the controlling standards for this sort of adjudication. To the
extent a court must passively rely on party control over and provision of data, its competence will in part be a function of the
clarity with which parties can discern and address the relevant
issues.
322. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 49-50.
323. It might superficially appear that many of the substantive areas with which the
fundamental rights cases tend to be concerned fall outside the delegation of powers in art.
I, § 8 and are therefore beyond congressional reach. That view ignores, however, the broad
power to spend on behalf of congressionally determined national priorities. Presumably,
Congress might exercise such powers in favor of research, grants to states, and federal
entitlements - witness, for example, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976)) requirement that children live with specified relatives
to be eligible, and the recent national concern to secure enforcement of child support by
absent parents. (See Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-647, § lOl(c), 88 Stat. 2359 (1975) (amendipg42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a), 603,606 (1976)).
324. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 310 (3d ed. 1972); see also Kadish, supra
note 308, at 358-61.
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The test of deeply embedded valuee thus demands independent satisfaction of inquiries into historical and modern conceptions of the spheres of liberty from which goverm;nent is presumptively excluded. Although each is at times a problematic inquiry,
the difficulties of application are partially offset by the stringency
of a two-level inquiry. If, for example, the relevant history was
checkered with shifting or conflicting trends, the availability of
the contemporary facet of the test would temper any tendency to
resolve the historical question dishonestly. In that sense, a twopronged standard offers internal checks, balances, and restraints
that no single criterion can supply; a narrow survival of the claim
on one inquiry cannot, by itself, tip the balance in the activist
direction. Because a "no" response to either of the questions demands rejection of the claim, opinions exploring the outer boundaries of both requirements should appear only when the Court
announces the discovery of a new preferred liberty. 325 That form
of restraint, in and of itself, should reduce some of the controversial and necessarily speculative judgments the test might otherwise demand.
Although the test would not completely answer the charge of
judicial revision of the Constitution, it would place a check on
fully open-ended dynamism in fourteenth amendment adjudication and simultaneously permit creative continuity in the development of substantive due process doctrine. Given the controversial history of substantive due process, the dual standard, with
its built-in forces of restraint, authorizes judicial intervention in
cases of extreme and aberrational departures from tradition in
matters of intense moral concern, yet at the same time leaves
ample room for legislatures to respond to new problems of legitimate public concern in any manner that does not threaten society's deepest values. Moreover, the proposed standard properly
avoids the delicate task of justifying regulation of private morals
and so-called victimless crimes; to the extent such matters have
been historically and continuously regulated by American legislatures, substantive due process doctrine would leave them untouched.
325. If the Court has decided to reject the preferred liberty claim on either ground of
the proposed standard, ordinacy restraint concepts should operate to preclude any discussion of the other ground. Cf. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (Court
need not decide if academic dismissal from medical school implicates liberty or property
interests because procedural due process requirements do not attach to academic determinations).
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2. The Standard Applied - Moore Reconsidered
The conclusions reached by the plurality opinion in Moore 326
would survive the scrutiny proposed here. In essence, the claimed
interest in Moore - freedom to structure a household with various relatives - is freedom to seek human intimacy. To share
common living space is to create the potential for both physical
and emotional closeness. The opportunity to develop intimacy
with others, furthermore, touches deep currents of personality.
Intimacy is the means through which we invest feeling in others.
Closeness permits emotional self-expression, feelings of caring
and being cared for, sexual fulfillment, and the grief and sense
of loss that death or other terminations of the relationship may
bring. Less positive, but no less inherent in intimacy, are the
darker emotions - fear, hate, envy. Of course, intimacy can be
developed without cohabitation, and conversely, common living
quarters do not guarantee significant emotional investment. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that a shared household immeasurably enhances the opportunity for intimacy.
Yet the Court in Moore did not equate shared living space
with intimacy opportunities. Rather, the opinions stressed economic necessity, the intergenerational transmission of family values, 327 and the prevalence of extended family households among
racial and ethnic minorities. 328 Notwithstanding the discomfort
and likely self-consciousness that might have accompanied more
explicit discussion of the emotional needs satisfied by living partners, greater attention to emotional satisfaction would have highlighted both the problems in, and reasons for distinguishing
Moore from, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. 329 The Belle Terre
decision upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited groups of
three or more individuals, unrelated by blood or marriage, from
sharing a single-family residence. The Court's emphasis on family patterns in Moore (a difference from Belle Terre) diverted
attention from the common element of the cases: potential satisfaction of deep human needs.
·
Families, whether extended or nuclear, do not generate
"need satisfaction" in and of themselves. As a mechanism for
pursuing such satisfaction, however, the social consensus prefers
326.
327.
328.
329.

See text at notes 154-203 supra.
431 U.S. at 503-05 (plurality opinion).
431 U.S. at 508-10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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family groups. More significantly, in light of the historical prong
of my standard for detecting preferred liberties, common and
statutory law have for many years reinforced ~he special rights
and responsibilities created by family ties. Even the most cursory
consideration of this tradition calls to mind the presumption of
parental fitness as a child custodian, 330 obligations of financial
support, 331 recognition of those obligations in various tax codes, 332
rights of parental control in childrearing, 333 intrafamily tort immunity, 334 the testimonial privilege of husband and wif'e, 335
family-based statutory rights to inherit, 336 and family relationship
requirements in various income maintenance schemes. 337 Government has not seen fit to bestow such privileged treatment upon
groups of unrelated adults sharing a household. The Court in
Moore and Belle Terre was thus not distinguishing between alternative goals of human liberty - the claimants in both cases
might have sought intimacy, as well as convenience, through cohabitation. The distinction that led to a "fundamental liberty
interest" in Moore alone lay in the methods for pursuing that goal
- Inez Moore chose one long sanctioned by legal institutions,
while Bruce Boraas and his friends did not.
That distinction may initially seem unappealing at best, or
downright censorial and oppressive at worst. Communal living
arrangements are experiments in human liberty, in the tradition
of Brook Farm, and may well offer extraordinary possibilities for
beneficial human development and interaction. To the extent
their occupants are otherwise law-abiding, such arrangements
present no threat of concrete social harm. Akin to other unconventional lifestyle choices, their only sin is that they may arouse
330. See, e.g., Ju.. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 3, § 132 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch, 119, § 1
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).
331. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 32 (McKinney 1977), These duties are not
necessarily restricted to nuclear family relationships. See, e.g., N.J. STAT, ANN. § 44:l•
140 (West 1977); see generally 41 AM. JUR. Parent & Child§§ 6-7 (1938); 67 C.J.S. Parent
& Child §§ 17, 24 (1955).
332. I.R.C. § 151 (b), (e).
333. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); see also MASS, ANN. LAWS
ch. 119, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op 1975).
334. See generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARsoN, THE TORTS PROCESS 519-21 (1975)
(noting the immunity doctrine and discussing departures from it).
335. See generally McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 161-74 (2d ed.
1972), and authorities cited therein.
336. This pattern is hardly a novel one in Anglo-American law.See Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. II, c.10 (1670); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 2-101 to -109 (4th ed. 1975),
337. To be categorically eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a child
must live with at least one specified relative. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1976).
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fantasies and fears of socially unacceptable behavior in the minds
of nosy neighbors.
Nevertheless, constitutionally adequate reason exists for a
community to prohibit such living arrangements when they lack
the connective tissue of the family relationship. Both historical
and modern social experience validate the judgment, albeit a
somewhat gross one, that households composed of unrelated
adults are likely to be more transitory than family units, 338 extended or not. Those with family ties to children are perhaps
more likely to assume responsibly the burdens of child care.
Moreover, in a society where the marital relationship remains the
only legally accepted outlet for sexuality, adults in a nonfamily
household, freed of the incest taboo that checks intra-household
sexuality in the extended family, are the more likely group to
offend the common morality by their sexual practices. 339
To be sure, all of the above distinctions are by no means
absolutes or universal truths. More troubling still, to permit such
considerations - some might say prejudices - to serve as an
obstacle to significant social change is to risk social stagnation.
On balance, however, I think these considerations are adequate,
for several reasons. First, some communities will tolerate alternative lifestyles. The nation as a whole thus does not lose the benefits of experimentation. Second, for a community devoted to preserving stability and morality, there exists no palatable alternative to bright-line distinctions between families and other groups.
No system of individualized hearings could adequately predict
which living units present substantial risks of community harm,
nor could any such system avoid outrageous intrusiveness in
gathering its information. Finally, it has been a constant tenet of
American constitutional tradition that, outside the realms of
thought, expression, religion and conscience, the political agencies of the community may define the limits of acceptable human
enterprise. Belle Terre is consistent with that tradition. 340 Moore,
then, represents a limited inroad upon it, based on a premise that
the family is the historically and culturally preferred means for
338. See R. KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY 182 (1972) (membership in many
modem communes "is rarely the same for long").
339. See id. at 185; see also W. KEPHART, THE FAMILY, SoCIBrY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL
121-41 (1977), reprinted in J. AREEN, FAMILY LAw 713-25 (1978) (discussion of sexual
practices in the Oneida Community, and public response thereto).
340. For an argument that communal life· styles deserve constitutional protection
against, inter alia, hostile zoning regulations, see Comment, All in the "Family": Legal
Problems of Communes, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (1972).
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satisfying certain legitimate human needs.
Viewed in that light, Moore is eminently more defensible as
a preferred liberty case than is Roe v. Wade. FreE!dom to structure
an extended family arrives at the Court with substantially more
historical and cultural support than freedom to terminate pregnancy. That the Court was more divided in Moore than Roe may
reflect a judgment by some members of the Court that the liberty
interest in Moore was not of deep significance. Such a judgment,
tested against the appropriate standards, is erroneous.
This argument does not imply that Professor Ely errs when
he claims that notions of consensus or enduring tradition can be
manipulated to almost any conclusion. 341 Of course they can, just
as any broad legal concept can be so manipulated. But that insight does not counsel wholesale rejection of broad concepts, including those particular broad concepts for which Professor Ely
frequently expresses fondness. 342 Rather, the insight requires
judges to be intellectually fit and honest, to understand the temptations to manipulate, and to appreciate the need to resist the
temptations. Of course judges are only "human", but I would
rather build a constitutional jurisprudence that assumes and
demands their best than one that expects their worst. 343

B. The Single Meaning of Equality
"What," asked Kenneth Karst in the opening sentence of his
Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, "is the substance
of substantive equal protection?" 344 His essay proceeded to develop his answer: a guarantee of "equal citizenship." I would
answer rather differently. Equal protection has no "substance" in
the sense in which I have employed the term. Equal protection
has a singular concern, and although "equal citizenship" may
follow from judicial respect for that concern, Professor Karat's
intensely substantive focus tends to mislead. The strand-tangling
in the fourteenth amendment led, understandably and inexorably, to the question framed by Professor Karst. In what follows, I
341. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 40-41, 49.
342. Professor Ely apparently is not troubled by the breadth of the concepts of
"discreteness," "insularity," and "minority," see note 348 infra and accompanying text,
as used in the Carolene Products footnote. Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 5-15; Ely, 37
Mo. L. REV., supra note 9, at 454-56; Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 729 (1974); Ely, supra note 88, at 933-35.
343. Cf. Ely, supra note 247, at 403. ("I hope we shall always judge judges in part by
their capacity to resist personal sympathy with the principle expressed.")
344. Karst, supra note 121.
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hope to demonstrate that equal protection thinking can be altogether shorn of libertarian substance within an analytic framework that enhances clarity and comprehensibility, while avoiding
all damage to the basic structure of modem constitutional law.
1.

The Limited Choice of Imperatives

If the original purpose of a constitutional provision is neither
hopelessly obscure nor irretrievably lost, 345 judicial elaboration of
it is properly limited to its framers' concerns and their twentiethcentury counterparts. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause (and its unwritten fifth amendment analogue) has
ascertainable roots. Given its motivating force and linguistic
form, the clause points to judicial protection against certain limited kinds of "class legislation" and it points no further. Hence,
the equality strand concerns only "suspect classifications."
But even at that level of analysis, critical choices remain.
The notion of "suspect classifications" has wavered between two
imperatives that reinforce one another in some instances and
compete in others: the "process imperative" and the "moral imperative." A struggle between the two has marked the last decade
of equal protection adjudication, and the constitutional resolution of the reverse discrimination question and many others may
ride on the ultimate choice of a victor. I will explain; fortunately,
my purpose in this Article does not force me to choose.
Agonizingly for anyone who must choose, both options are
wholly reasonable inferences from the objective of those who
wrote and ratified the clause - to constitutionalize a prohibition
of state laws that explicitly disadvantage black people in the
exercise of civil rights. 346 The "equal protection" language is of
345. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452, 463
(1978).
346. See generally Karst, supra note 121, at 11-21; J. TENBROEK, THE ANTlsLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951). "Civil rights" are of course not selfdefining, and a substantial portion of the past century's controversy has revolved around
the content of the "civil rights" concept. The narrowest view is that it includes no more
than the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see R. BERGER, supra note 246,
or perhaps the 1866 statutory rights and those closely related by analogy, see Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 365-69 (1879). The infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), took a narrow view of the civil rights protected by the__fourteenth amendment,
while Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), clearly embraced the broad, modem
view that any and all state-sponsored racial separation stigmatized nonwhites and, directly or indirectly, denied or impeded their exercise of civil rights. The "civil rights"
concept is thus "open-ended"; its beneficiaries, however, and the purposes of constitutionally protecting them, may not be quite so open. See text at notes 347-50 infra.

1056

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:981

course not so limited, and it is the uncertain import of the language chosen that has generated the difficulty. Each option seeks
to reconcile the clause's historical objectives ~nd its sweeping
language, yet the two theories are, at times, antagonistic.
The "process imperative" finds much of its judicial heritage
in the Carolene Products footnote. 347 The footnote suggests that
certain forms of prejudice may impede the operation of an otherwise fair pluralist democracy, and that the Court may be authorized by the Constitution to protect "discrete and insular minorities" against systematic operation of prejudice transformed
into law. The process imperative, of course, raises its own
special brand of questions - what constitutes "discreteness" or
"insularity" of a minority, 348 whether a "minority" is to be identified in purely numerical terms, 349 whether a Court animated by
the process imperative is free to probe the actual workings of the
political process, 350 and so forth. At its core, however, the imperative makes no moral judgments other than about the occasional
immorality of democracy.
The "moral imperative" is concerned primarily with the
qualities of the classification, not with the process that classifies.
It looks back to the framers' objectives and derives from them a
moral standard, such as "race should be irrelevant to governmental action," or "it is immoral to disfavor someone on the basis of
immutable characteristics (or group membership, or some similar
concept)." 351 The elder Justice Harlan's famous dictum about the
347. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4: "Nor need we enquire .•. whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
348. "It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a laWYer to find 'insular and
discrete' minorities at every tum in the road." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657
(1973) (Rehµquist, J., dissenting).
349. This is a problem in the gender discrimination cases. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality opinion) (arguing that, despite the numerical
superiority of females over males, the former are "vastly underrepresented in this Nation's
decision-making councils." 411 U.S. at 685 n.5).
350. This question has led to the interminable struggle over the extent to which
courts are free to look behind facially neutral government decisions in search of impermissible animating prejudices. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). For an excellent collection of essays on the Arlington Heights problem,
see Colloquium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978), For further
discussion and refinement of the Carolene Products process-prejudice framework, see Ely,
supra note 342, at 729-36. See also Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68
M1cH. L. REv. 629 (1970).
351. For presentations of this view, see Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on
Equal Protection and Due Process. 63 VA. L. REv. 383, 401-02 (1977); Ginsburg, Gender
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inability of the Constitution to distinguish among various hues "Our Constitution is colorblind"352 - was perhaps the earliest
judicial statement of one form of the moral imperative. As one
might suspect, formulating a precise and universally acceptable
moral imperative is no easy task. Indeed, the qualifications that
any form immediately provokes suggest that the moral approach
to equal protection is as problem-laden as the process approach. 353
The exact form of the moral imperative, however, is unimportant
for my purpose. What is important is to distinguish it from the
process imperative, and to realize that the process imperative
speaks from democratic political theory, while the moral imperative speaks from a vision of constitutional norms of justice.
During the early years of equal protection adjudication,
courts failed to perceive the gap between the imperatives. Cases
involving discrimination on the basis of race 354 and national origin355 provided no occasion for such perception, because that type
in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REv. 1; Kaplan, Equal
Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 363 (1966). Professor Karst's Foreword, supra note 121, at
22-24, argues in part from the moral imperative, but acknowledges the process imperative
as well, id. at 24-26; Karst concludes that the equal citizenship principle, which he champions, derives from a combination of both imperatives: "[T]he degree of suspectness of
a classification is chiefly determined by the degree to which the classification interferes
with the interest in being treated as a person who belongs to the society as a respected,
responsible, and participating member." Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
352. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
353. The game of qualifications is easy:
1) Race should be irrelevant to government actions (except for remedial purposes;
that is, except when courts, or perhaps legislatures, or perhaps bureaucracies, or perhaps
even local school boards, make "findings" of past racial discrimination. . . . The list of
"remedial" purposes is practically ·endless).
2) Immutable characteristics should not form the basis of legislative classifications
(except when necessary, such as strength or intelligence for job performance purposes, or
even race or gender if role-modeling is important, and so forth).
3) Persons should not be singled out for disfavored treatment on the basis of characteristics over which they have no control and for which they are not responsible ( except
strength and intelligence as in proposition two above, and except many families in cities
subject to desegregation plans, see proposition one, above. Again, the exceptions appear
to engulf the rule).
Perhaps all these examples reveal is that the moral imperative is rarely an
"imperative" at all. Even when a form of it suggests values we usually expect government
to respect, the complexity of our history, society, and collective aspirations eventually
transform all the moral imperatives into no more than "weights" in a complex calculus
of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, the weighing process begins with a search for norms,
and if describing this approach to equal protection as the "moral imperative" is a bit
simplistic, it at least forces the analysis into proper normative terms.
354. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
355. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 124 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
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of discrimination is "suspect" under either imperative. The general requirement of rationality of classification is similarly a function of both, although it leans toward the moral imperative. 356 The
alienage and illegitimacy cases did not seriously threaten the
unspoken duality of imperatives, because they too raised respectable claims under either. 357 Cases involving de facto wealth discrimination began to generate anxiety, because those claims fell
uneasily within either imperative; the group was not so "discrete
and insular" as some others for "process" purposes, and the possibility of "free will" entry into and exit from the class raised intractable dilemmas for earlier forms of the moral imperative. 3"s
The real crunch arrived, however, in a pair of explosive social
and political controversies - the issues of gender equality and socalled "reverse discrimination." They highlight perfectly the conflict between the imperatives. Is racial preference for nonwhites
in graduate school admissions unconstitutional, since it allows
356. The requirement that classifications rationally further a legitimate state purpose
helps - but not much - to shield minorities from thoroughly arbitrary impositions on
their interests and is a watered-down form of the moral imperative (inequalities cannot
be premised on attributes wholly irrelevant to legitimate governmental purposes). The
precise relationship of the varying forms and intensities of rationality requirements to the
starker outline presented in the amendment's text is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Gunther, supra note 98. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 56; Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). For a
powerful argument that courts are poorly equipped to engage in any sort of rationality
review, see Linde, supra note 230.
357. Both aliens and illegitimates have, as classes, been historically saddled with civil
disabilities, and both groups have been the subject of prejudice and stereotyping by
legislatures. For instance, aliens have historically been excluded on a de jure basis from
political participation, and illegitimates are disproportionately represented among the
poor and nonwhite. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(illegitimates); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens are a "discrete and
insular minority"). Under at least some forms of the moral imperative, moreover, both
aliens and children born out of wedlock are appropriate candidates for "suspect classification" treatment. In particular, both illegitimates and recently-arrived aliens fall within
statuses for which their parents, if anyone, are responsible. Of late, however, the court
has seemed unsure of what any of this should mean for constitutional adjudication.
Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
compare Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), with Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (minimal scrutiny for illegitimacy
classification involving aliens). Age discrimination cases have implicitly embraced a process imperative only. See Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Although age is immutable, and mandatory
retirement may be stigmatizing, the Court has consistently applied restrained review
standards.
358. For a discussion of the problems of treating wealth as a suspect classification
under either approach, see sources cited in note 66 supra. See also Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 978-84 (1975).
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skin color to control access to a scarce good, thereby offending the
moral imperative?359 Or is it acceptable, since its "victims" are
well-represented in the decision-making processes~ 360 Similarly,
are all gender classifications "suspect" because they violate some
formulation of the moral imperative?361 Or should classifications
that disfavor males be of no judicial concern, because males are
surely protected by the political processes? 362
Although· the Burger Court has reached no agreement on
these questions, 363 answers have been suggested and ably defended elsewhere, 364 and I raise them here simply to make one
point: while both imperatives are legitimate inferences from the
objectives of those who framed the equal protection clause, any
movement away from the "suspect class" notion that underlies
both of them lacks such inferential support. Regrettably, the
whole equal protection enterprise has been complicated by an
initial insistence that the "suspect class" decision was all-ornothing, and by a subseque:q.t nimble retreat to a half-way house
of "intermediate" review standards365 for classifications ap359. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.).
360. See Ely, supra note 342. The Bakke problem has immense complexities; the

statements in the text are painted from opposite poles, and fail to do justice to the subtlety
of the issues raised. Among other things, the statements in the text ignore the possibility
that certain forms of "benign discrimination" might overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality that could attach under the moral imperative. For general discussion, see,
in addition to Professor Ely's article, Kaplan, supra note 351; Posner, The DeFunis Case
and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT.
REv. 1; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1975); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of
"Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 559 (1975); :
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 995 (1974); .
O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REv. 925
(1974).
361. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)

(sex characteristic is immutable and "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society").
362. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword, supra note 9, at 9, 12; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
218-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
363. Bakke might have done it, but in the end did not, primarily because four of the
Justices (Burger, Stewart, Reh)lquist, and Stevens) rested their judgment on Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and expressly reserved judgment on whether or not Title VI
swept more broadly than the Constitution. 438 U.S. at 408, 417-18. In other words, those
four Justices read Title VI to embody the moral imperative, without deciding whether the
fourteenth amendment does likewise.
364. On the racial preference questions, see the commentary cited in note 360 supra.
On the gender classification problem, see generally Ginsburg, note 351 supra; Note, Do
We Need an Equal Rights Amendment, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499 (1971). See also Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977).
365. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classifications, to
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proaching, but not quite reaching, the core of either imperative.
The field remains in some disarray, and lately signs of continued
uncertainty have been glowing brightly. 366 Nevertheless, the
Burger Court's overall equal protection performance, despite its
substantive rhetoric, 367 has been generally consistent with a trend
of disentanglement. Equal protection advances have come at the
frontier of suspect class doctrine, 358 and even the Court's most
notable equal protection "retreat," in the school finance case, 369
marked an obvious withdrawal from the mistaken substantive
equal protection methodology.
2.

Reanalyzing Substantive Equal Protection

While recent developments may thus display tentative
movement toward untangling the strands of the fourteenth
amendment, it remains theoretically unsound to attribute the
previous decade's substantive fourteenth amendment developments to the equality strand. It is correspondingly unsound for
the Court to write of that strand as if it could legitimately lay
claim to that case law. The former vice misleads as to the legitimacy and proper scope of decisional law; the latter makes promises of equality-centered activism that should not, and probably
will not, be kept. Those equal protection cases that relied, in
whoie or in part, on factors other than the classification imposed
by the challenged scheme need reanalysis. The central cases concerned rights of interstate movement and rights of political participation. 370

a. Durational residency requirements and the right to
satisfy the equal protection clause, must be "substantially related to achievement of
[important governmental] objectives.") Compare Craig with the opinions in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), that, taken together, formed the majority supporting
invalidation.
366. See the cases cited in note 357 supra.
367. See the discussion of Maher u. Roe, text at notes 105-21 supra.
368. See discussion of the Burger Court era, text at notes 82-104 supra.
369. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
370. Although those cases involving claims by indigent criminal defendants to state
subsidization of the costs of pursuing appellate relief can be characterized as a portion of
"substantive equal protection", their procedural setting, their open acknowledgment of
due process clause roots, see, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) and 372
U.S. at 363 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and their recent drift away from equality-centered
analysis, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974),
differentiate them from the more tangled rights of interstate travel and political participation. The right to appellate process has become based on due process in fact and methodology.
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travel. As noted earlier, Shapiro v. Thompson311 was both a capstone to the Warren Court's egalitarian efforts and a glaring symbol of equal protection hyperactivity. Unable or unwilling to rest
the travel right upon any explicit textual provision, the Court
elected to protect the right through the equal protection clause
- one provision that clearly could not have been its source.
Shapiro's progeny have thrashed about in the analytical bog
of their ancestor. After Dunn v. Blumstein312 extended Shapiro's
teaching to durational residence requirements for voters, and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County313 reaffirmed Shapiro's
concern with deprivation of the necessities of life, Sosna v. Iowa 314
managed to distinguish and uphold durational residency requirements for divorce. Taken together, the cases seem a conceptual
disaster area. It would appear to take a legal Houdini to reconcile
a holding that residency requirements for "life's necessities" are
never permissible with a holding that waiting periods for the
exercise of constitutionally significant interests (such as marital
choice) are sometimes permissible. In fact, one need not be a
Houdini to follow his example - and untie the knots.
The uncertain course of durational residency cases is unmistakably a product of tangled strands. They have left the constitutionally unjustifiable suggestion that, except for the special case
of voting, 375 only the indigent should be free from state-created
impediments to interstate movement "with intent to settle and
abide." 376 One might expect that an equality-centered view of the
problem would produce such results; a more justifiable libertycentered view, however, could produce similar (though not identi371. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See the discussion in the text at notes 54 & 68-70 supra.
372. 405. U.S. 330 (1972).
373. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidation of one-year durational residence requirement

for nonemergency hospitalization or outpatient care for indigents at county expense).
374. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
375. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), rested its reasoning more upon the
Harper-Kramer standard of regulatory precision in franchise distribution than upon the
impact of the restriction upon migration. An honest assessment could hardly do otherwise
- the prospect of no welfare benefits on arrival might immobilize a prospective migrant,
but temporary disfranchisement is not likely even to enter the potential migrant's costbenefit calculation.
376. The phrase is from Justice Marshall in Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 255. It tells
us that Shapiro's protection is not for transients. The privileges and immunities clause of
art. IV is for transients, but the interests protected by art. IV appear, for strange reasons,
to diverge substantially from interests Shapiro and its progeny protect against a comparable xenophobia. Compare Maricopa County with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973)
(dictum that state may constitutionally maintain a "policy of preserving state-supported
facilities for [bona fide state] residents"). Wander aimlessly if you will, but if you are
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cal) outcomes in those cases, without the vices and distortions of
substantive equal protection thinking. 377
I suggested earlier that the travel right is one gleaned from
fundamental structural assumptions derived from the Constitution, the federal union it creates, and the supremacy of national
over state interests in that union. 378 A right so derived, and so long
recognized, is entitled to protection against state interferences in
certain instances. As Justice Harlan so appropriately recognized
in his Shapiro dissent, 379 however, elevation of the travel liberty
above statutory enactments is defensible only if it depends upon
the values implicit in that liberty and not upon the egalitarian
overtones of particular exercises of it.
Although the opinion does not fully disclose its premises and
may well have reached the wrong result, Sosna u. Iowa380 has
taken an important step toward untangling the strands in this
corner of constitutional law. Its means-focused, interestbalancing analysis is much closer to Justice Harlan's dissent than
it is to the majority opinion of Shapiro. That, in itself, is insufficient evidence of disentanglement, since the apparent review
standard of reasonableness in Sosna381 has appeared in other
equal protection cases. 382 More persuasive is the evolution of the
"penalty" theory, a theory clearly adapted to straightforward
protection of the travel liberty, and not to a consistent principle
of equal treatment for newcomers. As the cases from Shapiro
through Maricopa County to Sosna383 have progressed, the notion
of penalty has evolved imperfectly in the direction of "the likely
infliction of irreparable harm." Thus, a year without the basic
poor, do not get sick. On the subject of the evolution of art. IV privileges and immunities
doctrine, see generally L. TruaE, supra note 1, at 404-12, and Supp. 1979 at 34-40.
377. For an analysis of Shapiro and its progeny that reaches a similar conclusion for
somewhat different reasons, see Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications - A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 109-12, 11620. See also McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions - Fundamental Right to Travel
or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987 (1975); Note, Freedom of
Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YAIX L.J. 1564 (1975).
378. See text at note 238 supra.
379. 394 U.S. at 659-62.
380. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
381. 419 U.S. at 406-407.
382. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (expressly adopting intermediate
review standard for gender discrimination cases arising under the equal protection
clause), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (engaging in interest-balancing comparable to that of Craig, but without identifying the standard as such).
383. The "penalty" theory actually originated in Dunn, but, in light of earlier decisions marking the vote as constitutionally special, Dunn quite properly viewed a deprivation of voting rights as a penalty per se.
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sustenance that AFDC benefits provide and a year without access
to medical care (even if only nonemergency care) are both penalties. In the former case, common sense suggests the injury is
significant enough to deter some interstate migration. Whether it
does ijO or not, the conclusion is undeniable that one year without
welfare benefits results in a net, unrecoverable loss. If and when
the benefits resume a year later, the hardship created by their
absence is unremedied and irremediable.
Sosna stands in the curious position of having moved in the
right direction without fully recognizing the shift's analytic consequences. The migrant forced to wait for a divorce is also penalized, although the loss is not quantifiable. The harm may be
irreparable: potential marriage partners may not be willing or
able to wait, and the year of emotional uncertainty cannot be
undone. Moreover, a waiting period for divorce may be, in effect,
a waiting period for marriage, and Zablocki indicates that marriage impediments, aside from age and consanguinity, are constitutionally dubious. Furthermore, a person deeply desirous of a
quick divorce may in fact be deterred from migrating to 1;1 state
that imposes a waiting period. Sosna's movement away from
Shapiro's equal protection approach seems entirely correct, but
its outcome is not easily squared with the migration-protecting
principles for which that line of cases purports to stand. 384
Nevertheless, this analysis reveals that the reasoning of cases,
involving penalties on migration rights rests more comfortably on
the due process strand than on the equal protection strand of the
fourteenth amendment. The penalty theory is nothing more than
another variant of the unconstitutional conditions theme385 - a
waiting period puts a potential migrant to an unacceptably harsh
choice between interstate travel and essential government services.388 Nothing is novel or unique about careful judicial scrutiny
of burdens placed by government on the exercise of rights; that
scrutiny has always been focused on whether the state has interfered significantly with the private calculation of costs and benefits associated with exercising preferred rights.
Shaking Shapiro free from its equality moorings, moreover,
384. The state concern embraced in Sosna, that its courts not become "divorce
mills," would evaporate if all states were forbidden from using durational residence requirements for divorce.
385. See text at notes 152-54 supra.
386. See also L. ThmE, supra note 1, at 1005 n.18 (analogizing durational residence
requirements to judicial comment to the jury on a defendant's exercise of the right to
remain silent).
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may make a real difference in the outcome of related controversies. The subordination of the equality theme of Shapiro would
properly invite judicial examination of waiting periods that harm
the nonpoor. A one-year durational residence requirement for a
professional license, for example, might be seen to offend the
constitutional freedom of interstate migration, either because it
results in a quantifiable income loss to those who migrate in the
face of it, or more persuasively, because it is likely to interfere
significantly with the migration choice. Shapiro, viewed as a substantive liberty case and not as a "wealth-plus" equal protection
case, thus becomes an important weapon in the Court's libertyprotecting arsenal.
b. Rights of political participation. In the past two decades,
the Supreme Court has aggressively protected a variety of interests in political participation. These have included interests in (1)
a tegislature apportioned by population, 387 (2) access to a spot on
an electoral ballot, 388 and (3) exercising the franchise. 389 All of
these developments present serious problems of tangled strands;
indeed, the cases protecting interests in voting and fair apportionment may be the most difficult "substantive equal protection" decisions to rerationalize on a set of grounds that maintains
strand separability. 390 The difficulty has double-barreled dimensions: the political participation doctrines possess powerful
· connections with ideals of equality, 391 and some of the doctrines
are the input analogues of the output concerns expressed by the
process imperative. 392
Funneling political participation rights through the due process clause rather than its section one companion requires, on the
theories advanced herein, a showing that those rights are either
387. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The reapportionment cases
present a universe of problems of their own. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 73861.
388. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally Wilkinson, supra
note 358, at 956-76; L TRIBE, supra note 1, at 775-84.
389. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 763-72.
390. Professor Wilkinson strenuously argues exactly that: "[T]he realm of equality
in which judicial intervention is most desirable and justifiable [is] that of political
equality." Wilkinson, supra note 358, at 956. He refers as well, however, to a concept of
"political fair play," id. at 957, 961, suggesting that his views and mine may not be grossly
divergent, see text at notes 398-410 infra.
391. See id. at 956-67. They also possess powerful connections with libertarian and
contractarian values at the heart of the first amendment, and Professor Wilkinson so
acknowledges. Id. at 961-63.
392. See text at notes 347-50 supra.
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1) properly inferable from the Bill of Rights or other textual guarantee, 2) properly inferable from the constitutional structure, or
3) otherwise protected- by satisfaction of the "deeply embedded
values" test. The cases protecting candidate access to a place on
the ballot fall, the Court has said, explicitly within the first option: the first amendment protects the interests of both candidate
and candidate supporters in appealing to the electorate for support. 393 The reapportionment cases and the cases restricting inequalities in distribution of the franchise, however, have not rested
on the first amendment and need support from elsewhere.
An initial glance at text and structure deepens the difficulty
of justifying these doctrines. The creation of a national legislature
composed of elected representatives who possess the law-making
power, and the guaranty clause394 aimed at the states, suggest a
broadly democratic theory of government is assumed and demanded by the Constitution. 3~5 The details of franchise entitlemerit and regulation, however, seem quite clearly to have been
textually remitted to the states primarily39.8 and the national legislature secondarily. 397 Limitations upon state power to restrict
the franchise have emerged over time chiefly from the process of
constitutional amendment, 398 implying a national understanding
that only by" way of amendment of this sort was state power
!imitable. Under this textual analysis, Harper seems a less defensible result than Roe; the framers were silent about abortion, but
rather vocal about the source of authority to regulate distribution
of the franchise.
Inferences of the inappropriateness of judicial intervention in
support of these interests are not, however, the only ones that
might be drawn from this pattern. The search for "deeply embedded values" is not limited to extra-textual analysis of history and
contemporary values. Concentration on extra-textual sources of
393. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975). See also Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
394. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See generally Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article
IV, Section 4: A Study of Congressional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
395. Of course, one need not limit one's view to the text of the Constitution in order
to reach a conclusion of this simplicity. See generally Ely, 37 Mn. L. REv. 451, supra note
9, at 456-69.
396. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, amend. XVII. See Barrett, supra note 377, at 112. See
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123-25 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
397. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 121-24 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (relying
on U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, for the proposition that Congress is thereby authorized to
prescribe voter qualifications in congressional, but not state, elections).
398. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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fundamental rights tends to obscure a basic point - in constitutional law, the text itself is the best, although not the exclusive,
source of "deeply embedded values." The 1789 Constitution,
taken together with the series of enfranchising amendments, m
evinces a commitment to political participation values. The right
of the "people" to elect representatives and senators is secured
by article I, section 1, and the seventeenth amendment, respectively. 400 History has obviously validated the movement to popular election of presidential electors. 401 More fundamentally, and
with particular reference to state and local elections, the guaranty
clause may serve as an appropriate source of political participation values.
Although the Court has held that whether a particular form
of state government is "republican" or not is a nonjusticiable
question, 402 subsequent decisions have weakened the reasoning
which underlies that holding. 403 Indeed, the "one person, one
399. The 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments explicitly refer to "the right of the
citizens of the United States .•. to vote." Curiously, each amendment speaks as if it were
conferring some sort of preexisting federal right to vote upon a group of citizens previously
without the franchise. Yet there is no explicit right to vote in the 1789 Constitution.
However, a right of political participation may perhaps be structurally inferred from the
guaranty clause, coupled with the overtones of representative democracy present in the
presidential and congressional election provisions of articles I and II and the electoral
traditions that have emanated from them, see notes 400-08 infra and accompanying text.
400. To be sure, neither art. I, § 2, nor the 17th amendment, by themselves, are
capable of supporting the political participation doctrines, because the original understanding points too clearly to broad state autonomy in choosing which of "the people"
possessed the franchise, and in choosing the method of legislative apportionment.
401. Presidential electors have been selected by popular election in the states for
nearly two centuries. Surely, then, the right to vote in presidential elections meets the
tradition-consensus test of fundamental values set forth above. See text at notes 304-24

supra.
402. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). In Pacific States,
the guaranty clause was used to attack the constitutionality of a voter initiative as con•
trary to republican form of government. Thus, even though the case is often described as
a barrier to judicial protection of voters' rights through the guaranty clause, the case might
just as easily be interpreted as a decision upholding a state's use of the initiative in the
law-making process. In any event, the narrow holding of the case probably should not be
that "all questions arising under the guarantee clause . . . [are] nonjusticiable," see
Bonfield, supra note 394, at 554-56.
403. Even though the Court gave lip service to the Paci{ic States holding in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the result of that decision in many respects undermined the
view that the guaranty clause is nonjusticiable. First of all, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion, while explicitly disclaiming reliance upon the guaranty clause, nevertheless managed to at least partially dispel the notion that the guaranty clause and the political
question doctrine were precisely congruent, see W. WtECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE
U.S. CoNsTJTUTJON 279, 281, 292 (1972). Justice Brennan's reasoning appeared to suggest
that the nature of the legal issue involved - not whether it is framed in the form of a
guaranty clause claim - determined whether a political question existed, See Bonfield,

April 1979]

Untangling the Strands

1067

vote" principle may be nothing more than "a Guaranty Clause
claim masquerading" in equal protection garb. 404 To the extent
that the guaranty claims are justiciable, 405 moreover, the fourteenth amendment is the appropriate and necessary vehicle for
imposing values of political participation upon the states. The
guaranty clause creates no individual rights; rather, it describes
a relationship between the United States and the states, placing
upon the federal government a duty to maintain certain conditions of stability within each state, among them· a republican
form of government. 406 This underlying concern of the clause with
the rights of the people in the several states to a republican form
of government justifies the creation of derivative individual
Baker v. Carr: New Light an the Constitutional Guarantee af Republican Government,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 245, 252 (1962). Furthermore, none of the six famous tests for political
questions enunciated in Baker necessarily bars guaranty clause claims, see W, WIECEK,
supra; at 287-89. Finally, many commentators have persuasively argued that Baker v.
Carr and its "one person one vote" progeny are really guaranty clause decisions which the
Court has refused to label as such because of its unnecessarily broad interpretation of
Pacific States, see notes 400 & 402 supra.
·
404. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Due to the
nature of the state electoral processes assessed, reliance upon the fourteenth amendment
in reapportionment cases must be tied implicitly to the guaranty clause:
Regardless of whether one concludes that numerical equality of representation is
or is not one of the fundamental values of our system, that determination must
revolve about an interpretation of the leading constitutional evidence of our values
with respect to the form of state governments, article IV, section 4, of the Constitution, which guarantees to the states a "republican" form of government. It is in the
light of the requirement of "republican" form of government that the essentiality
of per capita equality ofrepresentation must be judged. If reasoned, non-population
bases for apportioning state legislatures are considered "irrational,'' it is only because. the concept of republican form of government, possibly as supplemented by '
historical practice and other parts of the Constitution, requires a representative
democracy based upon complete political equality of the individual . . .. It is this
argument and oply this argument which will justify a standard of "practical equality" of representation or practical equality with some "rational deviations" as the
standard for judging the constitutionality of legislative apportionment.
Israel, On Charting A Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future a/Baker
v. Carr, 61 M1cH. L. REv. 107, 135-36 (1962). Thus a citizen's right to equality ofrepresentation under the fourteenth amendment assumes that the Constitution requires state
governments to be representative democracies. The guaranty clause would seem to be the
only plausible source for such an assumption. AB Justice Douglas observed in his concurring opinion in Baker: "[T)he right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution . . .. A 'republican form' of
government is guaranteed each State by Article IV, Section 4 . . . ." 369 U.S. at 242.
405. See note 403 supra and text at notes 409-10 infra.
406. The clause reads:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.
·
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rights,· enforceable by way of the fourteenth amendment. Otherwise, the clause bestows a wortliless promise: individual citizens
of a state with an "unrepublican" form of government - and not
the unrepublican government itself - are the only parties likely
to hold the federal government to its guarantee. 407
Moreover, once the due process clause is viewed as having
any substantive content, that clause may appropriately be the
source - independent of the guaranty clause - of political participation rights. 408 The basic premise of such a view is that a
substantive content to the clause implies judicial authority to
oversee the "process" responsible for that content. Put differently, judicial concerns with legislative output justifies some concern with the process of input. Such judicial intervention is designed to enhance the openness and integrity of the political process, and to reduce (hopefully) the necessity for judicial invalidation of legislative outcome. It is an "investment model" of judicial activism - the bench may interfere once to avoid multiple
subsequent interferences. 409 So viewed, the judicial elaboration of
rights in political participation is activism employed in a healthy
search for restraint.
Just as the conventional judicial task when the clause's procedural dimensions are invoked is to scrutinize administrative
and judicial processes for adequacy and meaningfulness of the
hearing opportunity, so an appropriate task is to study those
issues of adequacy of political process which are subject to principled resolution. The day-to-day doings of legislative or executive
business - lobbying, horse-trading, information-acquisition 407. This approach is also consistent with the trend of modern Bill of Rights incorporation doctrine, even though, of course, it is not identical in analytic derivation to traditional Bill of Rights incorporation. Incorporation of those amendments takes the form of
creating state duties to match federal duties, with respect to various individual rights
claims. The guaranty clause "incorporation" starts from federal duties to states (not
individuals), and transposes them into state duties to individuals.
408. When political participation rights are channeled through the equal protection
clause, in contrast, they are inevitably plagued by the same shortcomings of substantive
equal protection elaborated earlier. See text at notes 93-97, 144-47, 177.79, & 364-69 supra.
Furthermore, despite the preponderance of equal protection rhetoric in reapportionment decisions, the right to political participation possesses definite due process attributes, see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-1 at 737; Neal, Baker u. Carr: Politics in Search
of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 252, 285. In fact, the right has attained "preferred" status:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, they must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
409. See Wilkinson, Three Faces, supra note 358.
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are probably not so subject. But the formal structure of representation is subject to "judicially manageable" standards, and it is
precisely that structure which is the target of the reapportionment and franchise distribution cases. Those cases demand a
minimally fair structure of input into the political process. Notions of equality may play a part in the determination of what is
minimally fair; the cases protecting criminal appeal access for
indigents stand as clear evidence of that. At bottom, however, the
Court has taught that minimally fair electoral processes mean
one vote for each voter and the required distribution of the franchise to all resident adults whose interests may be substantially
affected by an election. The due process clause, of course, does
not mandate that a citizen has a right to vote on all governmental
decisions or for all governmental officials. Rather, the clause protects the right to vote in those elections - federal, state, or local
- necessary to insure minimally fair citizen representation.
The substitution of a "minimum fairness'~ due process clause
theory of political participation for an equal protection centered
theory410 is more than mere rhetorical flourish: In part, the theory
is a formalized recollection of the origins of judicial concern with
political input - the Carolene Products footnote, it may be recalled, was appended to a fifth amendment due process clause
opinion and made no mention of the equal protection clause. The
proposed theory also preserves and buttresses current applications of the political participation concept, and does both to salutary ends. The preservation flows from the recognition of the
input-output relationship described above. Aggressive constitutional protection of the input rights is designed to safeguard, with
minimum judicial interference, the general civil rights and interests of the citizenry, 411 whether equality-related or not. The buttressing stems from the Court's repeated rejection of any general
410. The minimum fairness theory needs a good deal more development before it can
be viewed as comprehensive, either descriptively or normatively. In particular, the
interest-balancing approach used in the procedural due process cases to work out the
"process due" upon certain deprivations might serve as a more useful model than the
"strict scrutiny" equal protection model presently employed. Professor Wilkinson, while
preferring an equality-centered model, has said as much, Wilkinson, Three Faces, supra
note 358, at 976. Professor Barrett has also suggested the rejection of an equality-centered
approach. See Barrett, supra note 377, at 115-16. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 13-1
at 737 (rights of political participation, despite their doctrinal link to equal protection,
are rights "Poised Between Procedural Due Process and the Freedoms of Expression and
Association").
411. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. ofE!ections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533: 562 (1964).
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principle of absolute political equality on all issues and all matters. 412 Instead of theories of blanket political equality, the Court
has adopted the principle that political processes provide minimally fair "opportunities to be heard," a notion appropriately
flowing from the due process clause. 413
C. The Consequences of Untangling -A Broad Look
It is virtually impossible to anticipate every analytic twist
that might follow from consistent adherence to this Article's
model of fourteenth amendment adjudication. The consequences
of such adherence include reformulation of some existing doctrines, and the constriction and confinement of others. For the
most part, ·adoption of such a model would produce no severe
dislocations in decisional trends; untangling frequently will result
in changes only at the edges of some established categories of
judicial activism. Although some specific alterations have already been mentioned, it seems more fruitful here to speculate on
the broader consequences of untangling - the forces, pressures,
and influences such a development might unleash.
I have presented a framework derived from the untangling
that comprises several distinct elements, including continued
incorporation of the Bill of Rights guarantees, recognition of
rights derived from structure, protection of a select group of other
"preferred liberties", a somewhat canalized version of equal protection, and a doctrine of formal threshold political access. Although some of those elements are, in one sense, open-ended (the
content of each element is subject to change by interpretation
and socio-political evolution), the overarching framework is not.
Thus, the greatest pressure to abandon or distort it will come
from claims of important individual interests that are intuitively
appealing but do not qualify for special constitutional protection
under any of the components of the framework. Conceivably, the
doctrinal- order could buckle, and through tendentious, mis412. The Court's approval of extraordinary majority requirements in Gordon v,
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), special referenda requirements for low-income housing in Jomes
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), exclusion from the municipal franchise of a group of only
"partially interested" persons in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 99 S.Ct. 383
(1978), and huge government subsidies for presidential campaigning by, in essence, only
the two major parties in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), appear to signal n rejection
of an overarching theory of blanket political equality.
413. For related attempts to link due process notions to scrutiny of political processes
generally, see Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1411-18 (1978); Linde, supra note
230.
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guided, or inconsistent application, might soon resemble today's
"doctrinal disorder." 414 To that extent, the framework, like all of
the principles and rules of law of which it is ultimately composed,
is only as durable as the judges who administer it. But that objection can be directed at any attempt to reorganize a vast body of
judge-made law, particularly that of the constitutional variety. It
cannot be a sufficient argument against what is otherwise a beneficial structure of decision to contend that the pressures to breach
it will overwhelm. The doctrine can only be the engine; the judge
is the engineer. A faulty engine is a menace no matter who drives
the train; it is hardly prudent to avoid repairs on the grounds that
the engineer may be less than perfect.
On the positive side, strand separation offers significant benefits. It may help clear up the disarray and uncertainty that
presently engulf fourteenth amendment standards of review. In
particular, eliminating the substantive dimension of the equal
protection clause might clear the battleground on which the process imperative and the moral imperative compete. And once the
Supreme Court chooses a champion in that competition, it will
be on the brink of endorsing a single principle of equality - a true
core principle of equal protection. Hard cases will remain, whatever shape the core principle ultimately assumes, but equal protection standards would be far more straightforward and predictable in a system of separate strands than they are under today's
tangle.
The impact of strand separation upon due process clause
review standards is more difficult to assess. Shifting all concern
for substantive· values out of the equal protection clause and into
the due process clause will accomplish little if it simply preserves
an uncertain methodology under a new name. For the ·proposed
realignment to affect cases meaningfully, the me.thods of reconciling state interests with claims of preferred liberty must differ
significantly from those under tangled strands. The new.approach
might spring from the principles that already govern claims traditionally recognized as libertarian rather than egalitarian.
In particular, doctrines protecting liberty of expression may
serve as an abundant source of analogy. Over the years, the Court
has used a battery of principles to protect this freedom, including
a set of per se rules defining the content of protected expression, 415
414. See Monaghan, supra note 98.
415. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (three-part obscenity test);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (constitutional line of privilege for speech
inciting to crime).
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heightened demands for specificity and fair warning, 416 requirements of precision in the regulation of conduct closely connected
with free expression, 417 and insistence on adequate procedural
safeguards in maintaining the liberty system. 418 Although nontextual liberties will not produce a set of principles as comprehensive
as those generated by the first amendment, 419 one can surely
transplant the ideal of protecting a liberty system with a core of
principles that is responsive to the purpose of that system and
sensitive to the foreseeable threats to it. In Zablocki v. Redhail,
for example, the majority's recognition that less drastic alternatives to a marriage bar were available for enforcing child support
obligations420 exhibits relevant and appropriate libertarian analysis; the Court's reflections on the "underinclusiveness" of the
scheme - it failed to prohibit the incurrence of new long-term
debts by the support obligor421 - seem irrelevant and unnecessary. Furthermore, if the Zablocki Court had assessed the Wisconsin statute by analogy to the libertarian principles governing
free expression, it would have discovered a significant threat to
preferred liberty: the delegation to judges of power to authorize
the marriage under the highly discretionary standard "that such
children are . . . not likely thereafter to become public charges."
Once the liberty to marry is recognized as fundamental, doctrines
requiring clear and imminent danger to legitimate state interests422 and confining the discretion to make that determination 423
should play as criti~al a role as they traditionally do in speech
cases.
Similarly, the substantive due process clause holding of
416. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); see generally i.. TRIBE, supra
note 1, at 718-20.
417. See L. TruaE, supra note 1, at 682-93. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
418. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see generally Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970).
419. In particular, the government's active expenditure role in social programs keyed
to family relationships complicates the analogy. Government may spend its money in
ways that may discourage (unintentionally) the creation of certain family ties, although
comparable consequences would be intolerable in the system of free expression. Compare
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). That
the values of the expressive liberty system may at times require different sensitivities than
the values of other preferred liberty systems does not, of course, demand wholesale rejection of the analogy. It does demand thoughtfulness in drawing upon it.
420. 434 U.S. at 389-90.
421. 434 U.S. at 390.
422. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
423. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur424 can be compared
with first amendment doctrines that address state regulation of
the time, place, and manner of street demonstrations.
"Reasonable" regulation of such demonstrations has a specialized meaning: regulations are reasonable only if they are sensitive
to both the need for the street as an occasional forum and the
risks of censorial application of such regulations. 425 Mandatory
pregnancy leave provisions must, after LaFleur, overcome a similar burden. Although the Court has recognized a school board's
interest in continuity of instruction (just as it has recognized
municipal interests in peaceful and orderly thoroughfares), it has
also demanded that regulations be drawn with sensitivity to procreative freedom. 426
In the same vein, separation of the strands promises to reduce at least some of the confusion about the respective roles of
"purpose" and "impact" in fourteenth amendment adjudication. 427 Cases presenting issues of forbidden classifications - true
equality cases - have made clear that discriminatory purpose is
a necessary element of a constitutional violation. 428 Dispropor~
tionate impact upon a suspect class, while potentially relevant to
the issue of purpose, is not itself a violation. Since many truly
neutral and socially valuable governmental decisions disproportionately harm particular groups, an impact test would unreasonably impede governmental functions and create unpleasant pressures toward race-consciousness. Furthermore, only direct and
intentional government involvement in· forbidden discrimination
violates the moral imperative.and weakens the social forces that
oppose discrimination.
In contrast, evaluation of governmental purpose is less critical, though by no means irrelevant, to protecting a system of
liberty. Results are what count in the protection of liberty: 429 a
424. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
425. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 537, 553-58 (1965). See generally Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1.
426. But cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (noncustodial father of illegiti-

mate child may be denied authority to veto adoption of the child by child's stepfather).
427. The literature here is voluminous, and I can only suggest some possible implications of the thesis expressed herein. See, e.g., Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 953 (1978); Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson - An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
428. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
429. See Ely, supra note 161, at 1160-61.
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statute outlawing the distribution of leaflets in a public park may
be concerned wholly with cleanliness of the grounds, but the impact on free communication is too great for the law to be sustained. In a system of liberty, the guiding principle is the maximization of liberty opportunities subject only to those restraints
essential to reasonable public order. Thus, in a case like Planned
Parenthood u. Danforth, 430 the question ofwhether'the legislature
intended to suppress abortions need never be faced. The Court's
task instead is to assess carefully the consequences of the enactment; if it unduly or unnecessarily restricts procreative choice, 431
then it fails to meet fourteenth amendment requirements, no
matter how laudable its other goals.
In the equal protection area, the Court has generally been
faithful to purpose 'analysis when facing traditional classification
problems and to impact analysis when venturing into the morass
of substantive equal protection. In Harper u. Virginia Board of
Elections, 432 for example, the Court struck down the Virginia poll
tax for restricting the voting interests of the impecunious; the
Court properly never reached questions of whether the legislature
acted with the invidious purpose of disenfranchising poor (and
black) voters. In other cases arriving at the Court in a posture of
tangled strands, however, the distinction between purpose and
impact may be significant yet unperceived. A hypothetical derived from Zablocki illustrates the point. If the challenged Wisconsin statute had not denied a marriage license to one whose full
support payments failed to remove his dependents from the welfare rolls, it would have created no absolute bar to remarriage for
the indigent. Discriminatory purpose would have been much less
evident, and the issue would have become one of effect on the
marriage opportunities of those behind in their support payments, a group whose indigent and nonwhite membership might
turn out to be disproportionately high. A methodology that maintained distinct strands could ignore the demographics of the impact and evaluate only the gravity of the law's effects on the
marriage liberty. Candid acknowledgment that substantive due
process theories were at work would liberate the Court from the
potentially intrusive search for unconstitutional motivation and
430. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating spousal and parental consent requirements for
abortions).
431. I assume here that there will be no turning back from the mistake in Roe v.
Wade.
432. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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from the problematic inquiry433 into whether legislative excision
of the "bad" purpose would alter the constitutional outcome.
Finally, separation of the strands may have salutary consequences for the Court's struggles with the "equal protection component" of the fifth amendment due process clause. 434 Something
about the doctrine has always seemed mildly discomforting, even
discordant. As the strands of the fourteenth amendment grew
progressively more tangled and egalitarian activism gained favor
over libertarian activism, pressure increased for lawyers and
judges to recast fifth amendment claims against the federal government as equality claims. 435 Paradoxically, the more substantive "equality rights" that the fifth amendment due process
clause absorbs, the more textually superfluous the equal protection clause appears. Reduction of the content of "equal protection" to a unitary concern with forbidden classifications would
accordingly reduce the "equal protection component" of the fifth
amendment, since the latter is defined by the former. Claims of
nontextual substantive right, then, would always be due process
clause claims, regardless of which level of government is responsible for the challenged action, 436 and the Court would face fewer
"reverse incorporation" claims437 against the federal government.

V.

SEPARATE STRANDS -

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The revival of substantive due process signifies more than a
new label for old methodology and results. It demands clearly
articulated standards for identifying rights. Moreover, it requires
candid appreciation of the libertarian values that distinguish it
from equal protection review. Foremost, it demands a profound
sense of restraint. In the hands of a Justice determined to write
his preferences into the fourteenth amendment, substantive due
process is a dangerous weapon. But the last two decades have
revealed that the equal protection clause is at least as easily
abused as its companion. Its relative infancy as an activist tool
433. The inquiry is required by Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977). See note 350 supra.
434. See generally Karst, supra note 78.
435. See, e.g., Community-Service Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (portion of the Communications Act that requires noncommercial broadcast
media receiving federal funds to retain, for 60 days, audio tapes of all broadcasts "in which
any issue of public importance is discussed," but does not impose similar requirements
on commercial stations, violates fifth amendment's equality component).
436. Professor Ely would solve the problem of equality claims against the federal
government by invoking the ninth amendment. See Ely, supra note 247, at 444-45 n.158.
437. See text at note 79 supra.
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and its textual invitation to excess in the name of equality have
combined to overwhelm the forces of restraint. At the very least,
strand separation has the virtue of demanding that diamonds not
be palmed off as hearts, that the Court justify each and eve~y
choice of preferred liberty in its own name, rather than in the
name of overall equality. In that sense, the substantive due process revival, particularly if limited by the standards suggested in
this Article, promises to be more candid and more restrained than
the egalitarian revolution ever was.
A substantive due process revival coupled with genuine
strand disentanglement also promises to be more principled than
equal protection activism. The ghost of Lochner will always
haunt the due process clause. The history of conceded abuse may
operate as a force to channel substantive due process activism
into the most principled confines. Shapiro u. Thompson has yet
to spawn a kindred specter for the equal protection clause. Indeed, Justice Marshall, a leading proponent of aggressive judicial
defense of equality, has argued that his "sliding scale" is desira.ble precisely because it is not subject to the rigid confines of
principle. 438 Members of the Court would most likely be very hesitant to present a comparable argument concerning substantive
due process adjudication.
Furthermore, separation of strands might reduce the overall
frequency of judicial intervention into governmental choices via
the fourteenth amendment. An equal protection methodology
that examines substantive interests as well as classification bases
invites substantial intervention with its attendant potential for
abuse and unpredictability. Elusive and ever-changing review
standards have been the byproduct of entanglement. Disentanglement, as proposed here, would limit the 'Court's equal protection intervention to suspect classifications, and its substantive
due process activism to liberties protected by the Bill of Rights,
reasonable inferences from constitutional structure, and the survivors of a stringent two-pronged test of deeply embedded values.
Although such a channeling is not completely unresponsive to
claims for protection of new groups or rights, it does not permit
the fourteenth amendment to be the dynamic organ of societal
reform that some Justices and commentators have hoped it might
be.
Disentanglement will no doubt accelerate some trends in the
values that the Supreme Court protects by way of the fourteenth
438. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 461 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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amendment. Protection of Bill of Rights freedoms and full recognition of the "antidiscrimination principle" would be unaffected, 439 but disentanglement would reinforce the Court's unwillingness to unleash further the sweeping possibilities of substantive equal protection. Similarly, naked substantive due process
adjudication would be reduced to a more conservative role. This
is as it should be. Our society has undergone deep, rapid and
extraordinary transformations of political and social consciousness in the past quarter-century. The parallel growth of technology and turmoil throughout the world suggests that the rate of
change is not likely to decrease. Those great changes may further
aggravate the tension between socio-political ideals and sociopolitical reality. The Court undermines its legitimacy if it attempts to impose on a society in flux any dynamic, sweeping
extra-constitutional vision of social and political justice.
The phenomenon of community evolution underscores the
need for the Supreme Court to perform its traditional and vital
task of preserving constitutional values against the erosions that
change - and fear of change - can produce. For the most part,
only those values demonstrably inferable from the constitutional
text and structure merit such preservation. I have suggested that
substantive due process, protective of values drawn from outside
the text, also has a useful, though limited, place in our con~titutional jurisprudence. Its survival as an idea, despite the backlash
against Lochnerism, testifies convincingly to its endurance and
appeal. While substantive due process cannot and should not be
employed to stifle change or shield us from all our worst impulses,
it can preserve a few time-honored elements of freedom deeply
cherished in modern America. Beyond these, the cultivation of
ideals of community, human respect, and liberty is in the hands
of the gardener we chose when we bravely opted to govern ourselves.
439. This past Term offered hints that disentanglement will allow, but does not
demand, full recognition of virtually any principle at all. Compare Caban v. Mohammed,
99 S.Ct. 1760 (1979) (equal protection clause prohibits gender classification in scheme of
parental consent to adoption of illegitimate child), with Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct.
1742 (1979) (equal protection clause does not prohibit gender classification in scheme
authorizing parental suit for wrongful death of illegitimate child).

